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Antitrust and Employer Restraints
in Labor Markets*
Robert H. Jerry, it
Donald E. Knebelf
This Article argues that the Sherman Act regulates concerted em-
ployer activity in the labor market only if such activity restrains or at-
tempts to restrain the product market. After discussing the legislative
history of the Act, the Article examines and synthesizes two conflicting
lines of cases. Finally, the Article suggests how courts should dispose of
challenges to employer conduct andposits the basisfor a unified theory of
labor-antitrust law.
INTRODUCTION
The tension between federal antitrust law and national labor pol-
icy is both perplexing and inevitable. Antitrust law is premised on pro-
moting competition, but national labor policy is premised on creating
incentives in both labor and management for anticompetitive conduct.
This clash of antithetical policies has frequently required courts to con-
sider the extent to which the antitrust laws apply to labor union activ-
ity. From these cases has evolved an uneasy compromise between the
conflicting premises of antitrust law and labor law: labor unions are
exempt from the antitrust laws when their activities, which otherwise
would be illegal under the antitrust laws, are undertaken to achieve
goals approved by national labor policy; but union activity seeking to
attain an objective that is not a legitimate labor objective and that is
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condemned by federal antitrust law is not protected.' When conflict
arises between antitrust law and labor policy, one normally looks first
at the extent to which the antitrust laws apply to labor union activity.
The conflict between antitrust law and national labor policy actu-
ally suggests another significant issue: whether federal antitrust laws
apply to concerted employer restraints in labor markets, and if so, how
they should be applied.2 Concerted activity by firms to fix product
prices is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. How should courts
respond to concerted employer activity to fix wages and salaries, the
price of labor? An agreement among sellers of goods to exchange price
information when the intent or effect of the exchange is to stabilize the
prices of those goods may violate the Sherman Act.3 How should
courts respond to an agreement among employers to exchange infor-
mation about wages paid their employees when the intent or the effect
of the information exchange is to stabilize wage levels?
We discuss these questions and argue in favor of the following
proposition: the Sherman Act does not regulate concerted employer
conduct whose purpose or effect is to restrain only the labor market;
instead, the Act regulates concerted employer conduct which is in-
tended to restrain, or which actually has an unreasonable anticompeti-
tive effect on, the product market (that is, the commercial market where
firms sell their goods and services). Therefore, employer restraints in
labor markets are illegal, if at all, because of their intended or actual
product market consequences rather than because of their labor market
consequences.
This Article develops that proposition in six parts. In Part I, we
amplify the stated proposition and articulate some of the assumptions
underlying our argument. In Part II, we examine the legislative history
of the Sherman Act and find that the Act was not intended to promote
labor market competition. We also search the legislative history of sec-
tion 6 of the Clayton Act and find no contradictory intentions. In Part
1. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90
(1965); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 665-66 (1965). See generally Leslie,
Princiles of Labor Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REv. 1183 (1980).
2. This article's discussion is limited to federal antitrust law. However, because many state
antitrust statutes deliberately parallel the federal statutes, I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 58 (1978), the discussion is also pertinent to state law.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a fel-
ony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
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III, we explore the policies of the Sherman Act and reach the following
conclusion: even though promoting competition among employers in
labor markets may be a desirable goal, the Sherman Act should not be
used for this purpose.
In Parts IV and V, we consider the implementation of the Sher-
man Act in light of our earlier conclusions. Part IV examines this his-
tory through 1970. In particular, this Part discusses the Supreme
Court's 1940 decision in Apex Hosiery v. Leader.a We argue that this
decision advances the proposition that the Sherman Act does not apply
to labor market restraints absent unlawful product market conse-
quences. Part V analyzes the Act's implementation in recent decisions.
In this Part, we criticize a widely acclaimed line of cases originating
with Judge Mansfield's 1970 opinion in Cordova v. Bache & Co., Inc. ,'
which, we maintain, misstates the proper reach of the Sherman Act.
We argue that a line of cases devolving independently from Apex Ho-
siery illustrates a better approach to analyzing employer restraints in
labor markets.
Finally, in Part VI, we offer an analytical framework that synthe-
sizes the two lines of cases developing after Apex Hosiery. We also
examine the circumstances in which employer restraints in labor mar-
kets are likely to be challenged, and we use our synthesis to suggest
how courts should dispose of these challenges. As a concluding com-
ment, we posit the basis for a unified theory of labor-antitrust law.
I
PROPOSITION: THE SHERMAN ACT CONCERNS ONLY
COMPETITION IN THE PRODUCT MARKETS
Section 1 of the Sherman Act 6 provides that "every contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal." This section reflects Congress' judgment that
"competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free mar-
ket."7 Promoting efficient allocation of resources enhances consumer
welfare, because "ultimately competition will not only produce lower
prices, but also better goods and services."8
In Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,' Justice Brandeis ob-
served that the broad language of section 1, if applied literally, would
4. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
5. 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
6. 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. IV 1980).
7. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
8. Id
9. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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invalidate every contract.' 0 Congress plainly did not intend such a
massive dislocation of common law principles. Accordingly, the
Supreme Court has long adhered to the so-called "Rule of Reason,"
which requires a court evaluating the legality of a restraint under sec-
tion 1 to determine "whether the challenge agreement is one that pro-
motes competition or one that suppresses competition."" As it has
evolved, the Rule of Reason consists of two complementary analytical
categories. Restraints "whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to es-
tablish their illegality" are illegalper se. I2 Restraints that are not ille-
galper se "can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the
business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was im-
posed."" This latter category of analysis "is often thought to require
an ad hoc balancing of the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects
of the challenged behavior"' 4 in a "definable product market."' 5 The
purpose of both categories of analysis is to allow courts "to form a
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint."' 6
In applying the Rule of Reason, courts have long held that section
1 is violated not only by agreements among sellers of goods to stabilize
prices but also by agreements to exchange price information with the
intent or the effect of stabilizing the prices of the goods involved.' 7 By
analogy to these principles, one might argue that agreements among
employers to fix wages or to exchange wage information when the pur-
pose or effect of the exchange is to stabilize the price of labor are
equally unlawful.' 8 This analogy, however, is valid only if the Sher-
10. Id at 238.
11. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 691. See generally L.
SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST (1977).
12. 435 U.S at 692.
13. Id
14. Kissam, Webber, Bigus & HolzgraefeAntitrust and Hospital Privileges.- Testing the Con-
ventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 597 n.3 (1982).
15. Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 924
(1980).
16. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 692.
17. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978); United States v.
Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.,
262 U.S. 371, 389 (1923); American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410-11
(1921).
18. Employers are not "sellers" of labor, hence, the analogy to price fixing through exchange
of price information among sellers of goods is imperfect. However, combinations among buyers
of goods that restrain trade are also illegal. Eg., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948) (agreement of sugar beet refiners to fix purchase price for
beets states a claim under § 1 of Sherman Act); In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d
1148, 1159 (5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to recognize distinction between monopsony and monopoly
for passing-on purposes); National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 345 F.2d 42 1,
426 (7th Cir. 1965) (where manufacturers of macaroni products allegedly fixed the kinds and
proportions of ingredients to be used in the product for the purpose of fixing the price of the
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man Act is concerned with promoting labor market competition by
proscribing concerted activity that has as its purpose or effect restraint
of the labor market.
It is only recently that the possibility of applying the antitrust laws
to employer restraints in labor markets has received any significant at-
tention.1 9 At least two lawsuits have been brought by employees charg-
ing that employers have unlawfully used wage survey data to depress
wages in violation of the Sherman Act.2" Obviously concerned about
possible antitrust liability, employers are displaying increased sensitiv-
ity to the implications of exchanging wage and salary information.2'
ingredients, court concludes "where all or the dominant firms in a market combine to fix the
composition of their product with the design and result of depressing the price of an essential raw
material they violate the rule against price-fixing agreements. ) Therefore, the imperfection
in the analogy does not weaken it.
19. Cf. Note, The Antitrust Implications of Employee Noncompete Agreements: .4 Labor Mar-
ket Analysis, 66 MINN. L. REv. 519 (1982) (criticizing the fact that courts have not applied the
Sherman Act to labor market restraints, and therefore have not struck down any postemployment
noncompetition restraints under the Sherman Act).
20. In Boston, Massachusetts, a coalition of women office workers recently sued a group of
Boston area employers charging that the companies, all of whom participated in a wage survey,
illegally used the wage survey to create a low ceiling on wages paid to clerical workers in violation
of federal and state antitrust laws. A settlement was reached in the suit on August 2, 1982, pursu-
ant to which the employer group agreed to change some of its survey practices to preserve confi-
dentiality of participants, and not to include "any graphic displays of individual compensation
rates," job categories for which there are fewer than ten employees, and industry-by-industry
breakdowns. In the Matter of the Boston Survey Group, Mass. Super. Ct. No. 56341, Aug. 2,
1982, reported in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), August 13, 1982. In 1976, a complaint was filed against
a survey organization in California, but this suit was also settled prior to trial. Deborah Good-
speed, et al. v. Federated Employers of the Bay Area, No. 1685 (N.D. Cal., filed Aug. 10, 1976).
Although these suits were brought against employers, such a lawsuit could conceivably be brought
against a potential employer. One who has been denied employment might charge that wage
surveys were used to stabilize wages at a level above that which would prevail in a competitive
market and that this reduced the availability of employment opportunities.
Also, in 1979, a consent Final Judgment was entered prohibiting four mutual savings banks
from exchanging information concerning deposit accounts, assets, liabilities, income, investments,
and salaries of officers and employees. United States v. The Philadelphia Savings Fund Soc'y,
Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,917 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
21. One group of employers whose survey practices could conceivably be alleged to violate
the antitrust laws is law firms. Many firms share with other firms information concerning the
salaries they pay their associates. In fact, one management consulting firm surveys law firms and
compiles information on law firm earnings, billable hours recorded, fees charged, firm income and
expenses (including salaries and benefits provided to associates and staff). In the 1982 survey, 530
firms supplied information, and the consulting company sells a copy of the survey results for $185.
Nat'l L.J., June 28, 1982, at 2, col. 3. The Justice Department stated its intention not to challenge
a proposed survey of non-lawyer employee salaries and benefits paid by Maryland law firms, but
the Department's intention was explicitly conditioned on the fact that the survey would not seek
information regarding future plans of the participants with respect to salaries and benefits offered
and that individual salary or benefit schedules would not be revealed. United States Department
of Justice, Antitrust Division, Business Review Letter to Robert A. Summers & Associates, AT
202-633-2016 (August 5, 1981). Nevertheless, because of concern about possible antitrust liability,
some firms are reviewing these practices. See Galante, Associates Get Tough on Salaries, Nat'l
L.J., April 26, 1982, at 10, col. 1.
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Two articles recently argued that joint employer activities which re-
strain labor markets are actionable under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.22  Two treatises have approved this conclusion; 23 however, one
provided no support for its approval,24 and the other accepted uncriti-
cally the analysis of Judge Mansfield in Cordova v. Bache.25
The proposition urged in this Article challenges other published
views on this question. We believe that the analogy upon which these
views are premised is flawed; labor market competition-viewed sepa-
rately from product market consequences of labor market restraints-is
not the Sherman Act's concern. Because our proposition is novel and
22. Scheinholtz & Kettering, Exemption Under the Antitrust Lawsfor Joint Employer Activity,
21 DuQ. L. REV. 347 (1983); Altman, Antitrust: A New Toolfor Organized Labor?, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 127 (1982). Altman concluded that "both labor organizations and unionized employees may
raise legally sufficient Sherman Act challenges to employers' conduct that has an overall negative
impact on the competitive structure of either product or labor markets." Altman, supra, at 129.
Part of the basis for this conclusion is the related conclusion that "claims against blacklisting [of
employees] and wage-fixing" should be actionable under § I of the Sherman Act. Id at 141.
Scheinholtz and Kettering were less certain of their conclusion: "for antitrust purposes, there is
nothing special about the labor market, at least as regards joint employer activity that is anti-
competive in that market. Even though § 6 of the Clayton Act, literally read, removes the labor
market completely from the reach of the antitrust laws, that is proably [sic] not true." Scheinholtz
& Kettering, supra, at 352-53. One commentator recently reached a conclusion consistent with the
proposition urged in this Article. Hoffman, Labor and Antitrust Policy-Drawing a Line of Demar-
cation, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 51 (1983) ("The Sherman Act should not be applied to a combi-
nation of employers formed for the purpose of strengthening their bargaining power vis-a-vis a
union and having a primary effect on the labor market"). The Justice Department has yet to take
a definitive position on this question. On the one hand, it has suggested that firm-imposed re-
straints on wages might violate the antitrust laws, while on the other it has indicated that such an
arrangement might violate the antitrust laws if there were a concomitant effect on prices (i.e., a
product market effect). Compare United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Busi-
ness Review Letter to Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc., AT202-633-2007 (December 10,
1980) (Department declined to state that it would not challenge under the Sherman Act imple-
mentation of a wage-averaging plan proposed by Department of Labor, pursuant to which con-
tractors participating in federally approved apprenticeship programs would compute arithmetic
average of individual contractors' journeyman rates of pay in various skilled occupations and then
would be required to pay at least that amount); Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Busi-
ness Review Letter to American Hospital Association, et al., AT 202-739-2014 (June 12, 1978)
(Department declined to say whether it would take antitrust action on proposed "Voluntary Cost
Containment Program"), with United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Business
Review Letter to California Autobody Association, AT 202-633-2014 (Nov. 3, 1978) (Department
declined to state whether it would challenge under the antitrust laws a proposal by the Association
to determine by survey the prevailing wage rates at auto body repair shops in California, since the
"proposal could have the effect of stabilizing the body shop labor rates of competing body shops at
or about the prevailing rate determined by the survey," and since the antitrust laws prohibit "cer-
tain joint actions by sellers that have a stabilizing effect onprices") (emphasis added).
23. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 728 (1977); 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at
202 (1978).
24. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note !1, at 728 (isolated statement that "employers alone could
not agree, for example, on the wages they would pay their employees").
25. See I P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 202 ("employers agreeing on trade
restrictions in the labor market are subject to the same antitrust sanctions as usual when collective
bargaining is not involved").
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no doubt controversial, we begin with an explanation of some underly-
ing assumptions.
At the outset, it is necessary to distinguish between a "product
market" and a "labor market." As an abstract matter, the distinction is
simple. The product market is the market in which firms sell their
goods and services to consumers (i.e., those who will use the product);
the labor market is the market in which firms purchase the services of
workers. Viewed from the perspective of a firm, the labor market is a
resource market. The firm may use many kinds of raw materials to
create a product; these "input" materials are purchased in various re-
source markets. Labor is but one of the firm's resources, and it is
purchased in the labor market. By the same token, the product market
where the firm sells its finished product may be another firm's resource
market. For example, a steel producer sells its product to an automo-
bile manufacturer, who uses the steel to produce an automobile: the
steel producer's product market is the automobile manufacturer's re-
source market. The labor market is one of the firm's resource markets,
but from the laborer's perspective, the labor market is the employee's
"product market." In this article, we define markets from the firm's
perspective. Hence, the labor market is the market in which firms
purchase and laborers sell services. In reality, the boundaries between
product markets and labor markets are sometimes blurred," but these
complexities can be deferred for later consideration.
Firms that compete in the same product market have incentives to
restrain that market by fixing product price. Assuming output to be
predictable or itself subject to being fixed, firms within a single industry
can increase industry profits if they can control price. These profit in-
creases can then be shared by the cooperating firms. The tendency to-
ward price stabilization is so obvious and the consequences to
consumers are so severe that courts early on held price fixing among
competitors in a product market to be aper se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.27
Just as firms have incentives to stabilize the prices of their prod-
ucts, firms have incentives to stabilize resource costs, including the
26. For example, sometimes the labor being sold appears to be the product. In the profes-
sional sports cases, the labor of the players is inseparable from the product, namely, the "game,"
which is being sold to the consumer. The rendering of professional services by, for example,
lawyers and physicians raises a similar question. See infra notes 309-21 and accompanying text.
An extremely important "blurring" of the boundaries between product markets and labor
markets devolves from the simple realization that a labor market restraint inevitably has some
kind of effect on a product market. This fact must be accounted for in any theory of labor-
antitrust, and this Article will refer to and discuss it frequently.
27. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton
Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), modfed and aff9d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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wages, salaries, and fringe benefits of their employees.28 Employers in
labor-intensive industries who compete in the same product market
have an incentive to fix wages, since by fixing a significant portion of
product cost they can stabilize indirectly the prices of their products.
Employers need not be product market competitors, however, to want
to fix wages. Any firm which can reduce a production cost gains some
advantage. It may be greater profits; it may be a greater capability to
cut price so as to gain an advantage over product market competitors;
or it may be a greater capability to reduce price from a noncompetitive
level to a lower level where the firm can be competitive in the product
market. In short, employers that compete in the labor market, regard-
less whether they compete in the product market, have incentives to
stabilize wages.29
When a group of employers unilaterally restrains the labor mar-
ket, the persons most directly affected are employees. 3° Thus, employ-
ees are the most likely plaintiffs in lawsuits challenging multi-employer
restraints in labor markets.3" The employee's principal grievance is
likely to be a wage reduction he believes he has suffered, an injury that
results directly from the restraint in the labor market. Thus, at a mini-
mum, an employee-plaintiff is likely to attack the labor market re-
straint as a violation of the Sherman Act. The employee might allege
that an employer has engaged in concerted activity with other employ-
ers to stabilize wages and that this activity has caused the employee's
wages to be depressed. This allegation would typically be directed at a
group of employers that compete for a particular supply of labor.
Whether the employers compete in a product market is irrelevant to
this allegation. In claiming an antitrust injury arising from depressed
wages, this allegation depends on the assumption that the Sherman Act
is concerned with the effects of labor market restraints in labor markets,
without regard to whether the labor market restraint is intended to af-
28. Hereafter, wages, salaries, and fringe benefits will be referred to collectively as "wages."
29. See infra notes 352-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ways firms achieve
wage stabilization.
30. Where employees are unionized, a union might conceivably claim that it has been dam-
aged by the multi-employer restraint, perhaps by losing dues in a situation where dues are tied to
wages and an employee is blacklisted pursuant to a multi-employer conspiracy. However, the
union's injury is derived from the more direct injury to the employee. In such a situation, it is
highly improbable that the union has standing to assert an antitrust claim, even if the injury were
within the scope of the Sherman Act. See Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v.
California State Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 913 (1983) (unions lack standing to chal-
lenge alleged agreement by multi-employer association and its members to enter into business
relationships only with nonunion contractors and subcontractors); Altman, supra note 22, at 164-
69.
31. Unions are unlikely to possess standing in their status as a union. See supra note 30.
Moreover, under current law, unions cannot sue in a representative capacity for damages on be-
half of their members. Altman, supra note 22, at 165.
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fect, or actually does affect, a product market. If this assumption is
false, as we argue, the employee would fail to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted.
Nevertheless, the employee might claim that the concerted em-
ployer activity has anticompetitive purposes or effects in product mar-
kets. For example, an employee-plaintiff might allege that labor costs
are a component of prices charged by competitors in the product mar-
ket for their goods and services, that fixing labor costs enables the com-
petitors in the product market to stabilize prices, and that this is
anticompetitive conduct condemned by the Sherman Act. Unlike a
claim that attacks only the labor market aspects of a restraint, this alle-
gation would be aimed at concerted actions by employers who compete
in the product market. An allegation that the concerted activity is
among employers competing for a particular supply of labor and that
this activity restrains competition in the labor market is not essential to
the product market claim. A plaintiff making the product market alle-
gation need not establish that the Sherman Act is concerned with pro-
moting competition among employers in labor markets. Rather, such a
plaintiff undertakes to establish that the labor market restraint has a
purpose to affect, or causes an anticompetitive effect in, the product
market. 2 This allegation states a claim under the Sherman Act.
Stating a claim and proving it are, of course, two different things.
Rarely, if ever, would it be more attractive to the employee to attack
the employer's conduct as an unlawful product market restraint than to
attack the conduct as an illegal restraint in the labor market. This is
because labor cost is only one element of price. Establishing that a
firm's cost-fixing conduct restrained the product market is a very diffi-
cult task.
In an economic sense, any change in the cost of producing a prod-
uct can be said to have some influence upon that product's price. If
price is defined as the cost of production plus a reasonable profit, then
decreasing the cost of one input to the product will permit the firm
either to decrease price without decreasing profit or to increase profit
without increasing price. Thus, if employers conspire to prevent wages
from rising above a certain level, employers can either decrease prices
32. In addition to these two types of claims, both of which are based on § I of the Sherman
Act, it is conceivable that an employee might also challenge concerted employer activity under
§ 2. For example, in a situation where the employer is participating in a labor market restraint
with other firms who are its competitors in the labor market but who do not compete with the
employer in its product market, the employee might allege that the employer used the restraint
data to set its wages at a level that assisted the employer in monopolizing or attempting to monop-
olize its own product market in violation of § 2. In this instance, the purpose or effect which
makes the challenged practice illegal is obviously the effect in the firm's product market. There-
fore, this article will limit its attention to claims asserted under § 1 because it is these claims which
arise the question of whether the Sherman Act applies to restraints in labor markets.
1984]
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without decreasing profits or increase profits without increasing prices.
A change in a production cost may not result in a price change, but it
has a relationship to, and can be said to affect, price.
It does not follow, however, that all effects on price resulting from
a restraint in the labor market are undesirable or anticompetitive. If
the price of a product is reduced because wages, a cost of production,
have been decreased, the result favors the consumer. Similarly, con-
certed employer conduct designed to stabilize wages might prevent in-
creases in overall costs that would have occurred but for the concerted
activity and that would have caused the price of the good to increase.
If rising labor costs are restrained, the consumer may benefit from a
stable or more slowly increasing price.
Fixing the cost of labor might even enhance product market com-
petition. For example, suppose that firm A in city X and firm B in city
Y compete in the same product market, but city X and city Y, from
which firms A and B hire their workers, are in different labor markets.
If the cost of labor in firm A's market is increasing while firm B's cost
of labor is stable, firm A's production cost will increase while firm B's
will not. If firm A conspires with other firms in city X that compete
with firm A for a supply of labor to fix the cost of that labor, this labor
market restraint will allow firm A to maintain current prices and thus
remain competitive with firm B, which does not face the same increase
in labor cost. In the product market in which firms A and B sell their
goods, the labor market restraint in which firm A conspires actually
enhances competition.
Thus, any attempt to prove a link between employer conduct that
has the intent or effect of stabilizing wages and unlawful product mar-
ket effects burdens the employee with a difficult, and perhaps impossi-
ble, task.3 3 Moreover, though the question is not settled, an employee-
plaintiff may lack standing to assert an antitrust claim if he has to plead
an unlawful product market effect to state the claim.34 From the em-
ployee's point of view, it would be preferable if, to prevail on his Sher-
man Act claim, he need only establish that the purpose or effect of the
concerted employer activity is to restrain the labor market. In short,
the scope of the Sherman Act is of crucial significance to employee
plaintiffs who challenge multi-employer activity restraining labor mar-
kets under the Sherman Act.
For various reasons, it may also be good public policy to promote
competition among employers in the same labor market. Joint em-
ployer activity to stabilize wages, under traditional economic analysis,
results in inefficiencies in labor markets and a consequent misallocation
33. See infra notes 367-75 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 343-51 and accompanying text.
ANTITRUST AND EMPLOYER RESTRAINTS
of resources." Since price is a function of production costs and labor is
one such cost, inefficient labor markets can result in inefficient product
markets. Eliminating all market inefficiencies, wherever they are
found, may be a worthy goal.
Whatever merit these may be to pursuing efficiency in all sectors
of the economy, the Sherman Act is not the appropriate device for pro-
moting efficiency in labor markets; it is a blunt tool that cannot be used
effectively for that purpose. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding
the enactment of the Sherman Act and the history of its implementa-
tion demonstrate that the Act is concerned with product market compe-
tition, not with labor market competition. Therefore, it is not merely
inappropriate to use the Sherman Act to promote efficiency in labor
markets; it is also contrary to the Act's purpose.
Simply because the Sherman Act does not concern itself with labor
market competition, however, one cannot argue that all labor market
restraints are legal. One must subject labor market restraints alleged to
have either a purpose to affect, or an anticompetitive effect in, a prod-
uct market to the normal substantive tests for antitrust liability under
the Sherman Act. If a labor market restraint has an unreasonable an-
ticompetitive effect in a product market, or if it can be shown that firms
have implemented a labor market restraint with the intent of fixing
product price, the restraint is invalid under ordinary Sherman Act
principles.
Attempts to evaluate the legality of employer-imposed restraints
on labor market competition without analysis of the product market
significance of the restraints ignore both the legislative history and poli-
cies of the Sherman Act. We now examine the Act's history.
35. In the language of economists, a firm will continue to employ additional units of labor
(or any other factor of production) so long as the extra revenue received from the sale of the extra
output produced by the extra unit of the labor (the marginal revenue product of labor) exceeds the
extra cost necessary to acquire the extra unit of labor (the marginal cost of labor). Equilibrium in
the labor market occurs when the marginal revenue product of a unit of labor is equal to its
marginal cost. When the firm is a perfect competitor in the labor market, the marginal cost of
labor equals the wage rate, so that in equilibrium, it can be said that the marginal revenue product
of labor, the marginal cost of labor, and the wage rate are equivalent. If the firm is a monopsonist
in the labor market, the marginal cost of labor will exceed the wage rate, but the monopsonist will
still equate the marginal revenue product of labor with its marginal cost. The effect of monopsony
in the resource market is to reduce the wage rate: labor is paid a wage less than both its marginal
revenue product and the value of its marginal product. When labor is paid a wage rate less than
its marginal revenue product, a misallocation of resources occurs. See A. LEVENSON & B. SOLON,
ESSENTIAL PRICE THEORY 240-45 (1971); J. KREPs, G. SOMERS, & R. PERLMAN, CONTEMPORARY
LABOR ECONOMICS: ISSUES, ANALYSIS, AND POLICIES 268-72 (1974).
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II
HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
Those who believe that the Sherman Act applies to employer-im-
posed restraints on labor market competition have premised their view
on the argument that no exemption excepts such restraints from anti-
trust scrutiny, ignoring the question of whether such conduct is within
the scope of the Act in the first place.36 However, the legislative history
of the Sherman Act does not support the proposition that Congress in-
tended the Sherman Act to be used to regulate employer competition in
labor markets. Congress was concerned with restraints in product mar-
kets. This distinction is significant because the legitimate reach of the
Sherman Act must be based, at least in part, on "the contemporary
legal context in which Congress acted""7 when the Sherman Act was
passed.
The Sherman Act was an 1890 response to populist clamor over
the rising influence of "trusts" and other large aggregations of capital
after the Civil War.38 Congress first began to concern itself with anti-
trust legislation in 1888, when several antitrust bills were introduced in
both houses.3 9 Although the specific language in these bills varied, al-
most all of them were aimed at prohibiting restraints on competition in
product markets.4' The first significant action occurred in the Senate
36. See infra text accompanying notes 221-52.
37. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc., v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 905 (1983).
38. W. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 54-70 (1965); 16 BUSINESS ORGA-
NIZATIONS, J. Von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation, § 2.02 (1971); 1 E. KINT-
NER, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS, 9-13 (1978). See generally
H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 54-163 (1955).
39. See Bills and Debate in Congress Relating to Trusts, S. Doc. No. 147, 57th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-68 (1903) [hereinafter S. Doc. No. 147].
40. Most of the bills introduced in the House of Representatives in 1888 were unambigu-
ously directed at restraints on the marketing of goods and services. Eg., H.R. 6117, 50th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1888), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, .rupra note 39, at 41 (prohibiting certain contracts,
etc., concerning the control of "the price of any article of merchandise or commerce, or of any
article intended for sale, use, or consumption . . ." H.R. 8036, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888), re-
printedhn id at 45 (prohibiting contracts, etc. "by which it shall be agreed that such pool, combi-
nation, [etc.] . . . shall control the quantity, number, or value which shall be mined, made,
manufactured or sold of such article or product"); H.R. 9449, 50th Cong., Ist Sess. (1888), re-
printed in id at 49 (prohibiting combinations, etc. that "limit, or otherwise regulate or control, any
business or branch of trade, or the quantity, number, amount, or value of any article of merchan-
dise or of trade or commerce or product which shall be mined, manufactured, bought, sold, or
shipped from one State or Territory to another..."). A number of other bills, including some in
the Senate, prohibited "restrictions on trade" or "restraints on trade," in addition to prohibiting
conduct that increased or reduced the price of variously described "merchandise," "commodities,"
"goods," "wares," or "products." Exactly what the drafters of these bills thought they were
prohibiting when they proscribed "restraints on trade" or "restriction on trade" is unclear, see
infra note 48, but even these bills emphasized product market competition. See, e.g., H.R. 3440,
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on July 10, 1888, when Senator John Sherman of Ohio introduced a
resolution directing the Committee on Finance, of which he was a
ranking member,4 to inquire into control of trusts. This resolution is
significant because it evidences the "motivating spirit" of the federal
antitrust statute whose name it bears.42  The resolution directed the
Committee on Finance to report measures:
to set aside, control, restrain, or prohibit all arrangements, contracts,
agreements, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations,
made with a view, or which tend to preventfree andfull competition in the
production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic growth orproduc-
don, or the sale of articles imported into the United States, or which,
against public policy, are designed or tend to foster monopoly or to artii-
cially advance the cost to the consumer of necessary articles of human
life, with such penalties and provisions, and as to corporations, with
such forfeitures, as will tend to preservefreedom of trade and produc-
tion, the natural competition of increasing production, [and] the lowering
ofprices by such competition .... 43
The first two italicized phrases are the evils Sherman wished to
prevent, and the third italicized phrase describes the benefits Sherman
hoped to attain.' Both evils relate to concerted activity that impairs
competition in the product market; the benefits he hoped to attain flow
from the elimination of that impairment. The competition Sherman
sought to promote was in "articles of domestic growth or production."
For Sherman, "articles" were goods, the commodities provided by sell-
ers to consumers. He did not intend that the term "articles" include
"human beings," for he also referred to "necessary articles of human
life" whose cost to consumers the trusts were increasing. Significantly,
only twenty years earlier the Supreme Court had referred to the
"proper meaning" of the term "articles of commerce" as "subjects of
trade or barter offered in the market as something having an existence
and value independent of the parties to them."" Articles of commerce
50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); H.R. 9449, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888) reprintedin S. Doc. No. 147,
supra note 39, at 49. Only one bill, which was introduced in the House, clearly prohibited multi-
employer restraints in labor markets. H.R. 6113, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888), reprinted in S. Doc.
No. 147, supra note 39, at 30 (prohibiting the conduct of "any person or corporation who shall
enter into any combination, agreement, conspiracy, or understanding, expressed or implied, to
raise, depress, or regulate the prices of any produce, manufactured article, merchandise of any
kind, stocks, bonds, or labor...").
41. W. LETWIN, supra note 38, at 245.
42. H. THORELLI, supra note 38, at 168, 213. See Walker, Who Wrote the Sherman Law? 73
CENT. L.J. 257, 258 (1911).
43. Senate Resolution Directing the Committee on Finance to Inquire Into Control of Trusts
in Connection With Revenue Bills, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. (1888); 19 CONG. REC. 6041 (1888); 1 E.
KiNTNER, supra note 38, at 54-55 (emphasis added).
44. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. OF L. AND ECON. 7, 15
n.! 1 (1966).
45. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868) (emphasis added).
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were "commodities to be shipped, or forwarded from one State to an-
other, and then put up for sale."46 Sherman undoubtedly continued to
use the term "article" in this sense in the antitrust bill which he intro-
duced on August 14, 1888. 47 Thus, from the very beginning, Sherman's
focus was upon the product market, the market where goods and serv-
ices are sold.4 8
The Fiftieth Congress adjourned without enacting antitrust legis-
46. Id
47. 21 CONG. REc. 2456 (1890), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147,supra note 39, at 91,andin 1 E.
KINTNER, supra note 38, at 63-64. S. 3445 declared unlawful "all arrangements, contracts, agree-
ments, trusts, or combinations between persons or corporations made with a view, or which tend,
to prevent full and free competition in the production, manufacture, or sale of articles of domestic
growth or production, or of the sale of articles imported into the United States, and all arrange-
ments [etc.]. . . designed, or which tend, to advance the cost of the consumers of any such articles
48. On a few occasions, Sherman also explained the object of the bill as codifying "old and
well-recognized principles of the common law" that prevailed in England and the United States.
E.g., id, reprintedin S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 91, andin I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at
69, 114; 20 CoNrG. REc. 1167 (1889), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 69. That the
Sherman act was intended to invalidate restraints "deemed illegal at common law" is a theme that
found its way into a number of decisions interpreting the Sherman Act. Eg., Apex Hosiery v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 498 (1940), and cases cited in id at 498 n.19; United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cit. 1898), aft'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). This is, perhaps, regrettable,
since Sherman and his colleagues no doubt misunderstood the then prevailing common law on
monopoly and restraints of trade, which in 1890 was rather weak. See W. LETWIN, supra note 38,
at 19-52, 77-81.
In Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the Court observed that a combination of
employees "was not considered an illegal restraint of trade at common law when the Sherman Act
was adopted." Id at 502. This fact, plus the enactment of § 6 of the Clayton Act, made it "seem
plain" to the Court that "restraints on the sale of the employee's services to the employer.., are
not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce under the Sher-
man Act." Id at 503. The Court referred to the English law on employee combinations, observ-
ing that "[t]he experience in the United States has paralleled that in England." 1d at 502 n.23.
Interestingly, by 1890, the law of England did not prohibit employer restraints in labor markets.
Under the Combination Act of 1800, 38 Geo. III, ch. 106 (1800), employers as well as workers
were prohibited from combining. W. LETWIN, supra note 38, at 47. The Benthamites persuaded
Parliament in 1824 to give combinations of workers and masters immunity from all statutory and
common-law prohibitions against organizing but workmen made such "uninhibited use" of the
immunity that Parliament restored common law prohibitions in 1825. Id, at 47-48. In 1855, the
Queen's Bench in Hilton v. Eckersley, 119 Eng. Rpt. 781 (1855), refused to enforce an agreement
between eighteen cotton mill owners to fix wages and working hours by majority vote. Relying on
precedents that declared unlawful combinations of laborers to increase wages, Crompton, J.
stated: "Combinations of this nature, whether on the part of the workmen to increase, or of the
masters to lower, wages were equally illegal." Id at 784. Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred, stating
"there must be complete reciprocity between liberty to the masters and liberty to the men." Id. at
789. The result in this case, however, was rendered obsolete by the Combination Act of 1875, 38
& 39 Vict., ch. 86, which legalized all combinations of workers and masters to settle labor disputes
and to negotiate hours and conditions of labor. W. LETWIN, supra note 38, at 49. Pursuant to § 3
of that Statute, "lain agreement or combination by two or more persons to do or procure to be
done any act in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between employers and workmen
shall not be indictable as a conspiracy... " Thus, the Combination Act of 1875 legalized the
multiemployer agreement fixing wages and hours held unlawful in Hilton v. Eckersley, and it was
this law which was in force in 1890 when the Sherman Act was passed.
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lation. When the Fifty-first Congress convened, Sherman introduced
the first Senate bill, which was nearly identical to the one he had intro-
duced in the previous Congress.49 S.1 was the antitrust bill eventually
passed by Congress, but a number of other antitrust bills were intro-
duced in the Fifty-first Congress. Again, most, if not all, of the bills
were directed at product market restraints.50
In the debate on S.1, Sherman maintained his focus on product
market competition. He explained that the concerted activity with
which he was concerned was the combination of corporations, partner-
ships, and individuals in "trusts," whose "sole object" was "to make
competition impossible." 5' He called for the dispersion of the power of
trusts because of their ability to "control the market, raise or lower
prices, as will best promote [their] selfish interests, reduce prices in a
particular locality and break down competition and advance prices at
will where competition does not exist."'52 All of these were product
market effects. The object of his proposed legislation was, at its roots,
to protect consumers, because his principal concern was with the dam-
age monopoly could do to consumer welfare.5 3 This damage was done
to consumers in the markets where they purchased "articles of com-
merce." As Sherman explained, "[tihe original bill deals with a combi-
nation, agreement or contract to advance the price of productions on
hand; it relates to actual commerce in things tangible passing from State
"154to State ....
If Sherman were equally concerned with the power that combina-
tions could exert in the markets where they purchased the labor with
which they manufactured their products, he certainly did not empha-
size the problem. On one occasion, Sherman did refer to the ability of
trusts to control the price of labor: he explained that a trust derives its
power "to command the power of labor without fear of strikes" from
49. S. 1, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 69.
50. See, e.g., S. 6, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147,supra note 39, at
411 (prohibiting contracts, etc., which prevent or tend to prevent "full and free competition in the
importation, transportation, manufacturing, or sale of any article of merchandise, or which shall
have the effect of advancing the cost of any such article to the consumer ..."); H.R. 91, 51st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 417 (prohibiting certain
contracts concerning "any commodity or article of merchandise"); H.R. 202, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1889), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 421 (prohibiting certain contracts, etc.,
pertaining to "the manufacture or production of any article of commerce" and to "the price of any
article or commodity of merchandise or commerce").
51. 21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890), reprintedin S. Doc. No. 147, at 95, supra note 39,andin I E.
KINTNER, supra note 38, at 117.
52. Id
53. See Association of Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908-09 (1983); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979);
Bork, supra note 44, at 16.
54. 21 CONG. REc. 2562 (1890), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 149, and in I
E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 162.
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the fact that "in its field it allows no competitors."55 This sketchy pas-
sage does not show that Sherman intended the legislation to apply to
labor markets. Given Sherman's preoccupation with effects in com-
mercial markets, he probably viewed the power of trusts to depress
wages as an undesirable byproduct of the combination, and assumed
that the ability of trusts to impose restraints on the labor market would
be eliminated if the concentration of economic power in commercial
markets was corrected. Thus, Sherman presumably saw federal anti-
trust legislation as a solution for the depression of wages by trusts, not
because his bill had any applicability to labor markets, but because his
bill would promote competition in markets for goods and services.
Indeed, if Sherman desired that his bill be applied to labor mar-
kets, he would have had to reverse prevailing congressional and judi-
cial attitudes concerning Congress' power to regulate commerce. In
1890, Congress' commerce power was perceived to be limited in two
ways: first, as to reach--Congress could not regulate commerce within
the boundaries of an individual State; and, second, as to nature-activ-
ities whose nature did not involve shipments of goods were simply not
"commerce." Thus, in 1890, the activities of manufacturing, produc-
tion, and mining were matters not subject to regulation by Congress. 56
Consistent with this narrow view, the employer-employee relationship
was also thought in 1890 to be beyond Congress' regulatory power.57
Thus, it is highly unlikely that either Sherman or Congress had any
intent to attack employer restraints in labor markets with antitrust leg-
islation since Congress was thought to have no power to do so.
Attributing this understanding to Sherman helps explain part of
the disagreement between Sherman and Senator George, the principal
critic of Sherman's bill. George argued that the bill might be used to
destroy farmers' cooperatives and other organizations such as labor un-
55. Id at 2457reprintedin S. Doc. No. 147,supra note 39, at 95, andin 1 E. KINTNER, supra
note 38, at 117.
56. E.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 13 (1895). See Bork, supra note 41, at
31; Stem, The Commerce Clause and the NationalEconomy 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645, 648-
49 (1946); H. VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 139
(1887).
57. This perception persisted well into the twentieth century. Congress did not even attempt
to use the commerce power to regulate the employer-employee relationship until 1916, when it
passed the Child Labor Act, which sought to ameliorate substandard working conditions by
preventing interstate commerce in the products of child labor. Child Labor Act, ch. 432, 39 Stat.
675 (1916) (replaced by Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1976)). The Supreme Court
struck down this attempt. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) ("Over interstate trans-
portation, or its incidents, the regulatory power of Congress is ample, but the production of arti-
cles intended for interstate commerce is a matter of local regulation.") It was not until 1937 that
the Supreme Court upheld the validity of federal legislation regulating the employer-employee
relationship under the commerce power. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
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ions.58 When George first made this argument, Sherman was probably
astonished, for his response was, "That is a very extraordinary proposi-
tion." 59 Sherman probably did not understand how George thought
Congress could regulate most of those groups, under the commerce
power in the first place since their membership often was located within
a single state. Earlier, Sherman had explained that his bill would reach
only contracts for the importation or interstate transport of goods:
[Section 1] makes such agreements and combinations unlawful, and it
goes as far as the Constitution permits Congress to go, because it only
deals with two classes of matters: contracts which affect the importa-
tion of goods into the United States, which is foreign commerce, and
contracts which affect the transportation and passage of goods from one
State to another. The Congress of the United States can go no farther
than that.6 °
The first time after George's argument that Sherman spoke in defense
of his bill, he expressed his belief that the bill would not reach any
intrastate activity:
All the combinations at which this bill aims are combinations embrac-
ing persons and corporations of several States. . . This bill does not
include combinations within a State .... 61
The next day, Senator Teller, after reiterating George's concern
that the proposed law might be used to destroy trade unions, asked
Senator Reagan, who had proposed his own bill as a substitute for S. 1:
If. . .a class of laborers should combine to raise the price of their
labor, and thus have a tendency to increase the price of the product,
whether it was in a mill, or in a shop or on a farm, would it not fall
within the inhibition of this bill, both the original [Sherman] bill and
the amendment of [Senator Reagan]? 62
Senator Reagan replied that Mr. Teller was misled by reading a section
of Reagan's bill in isolation. The bill's reach was limited to "matters
involved in commerce with foreign nations and between the States. 63
Thus, he reasoned, his bill would not apply to labor groups: "I suggest
58. 20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38 at 77-78.
59. Id, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38 at 79. Sherman also said: "There is noth-
ing in the bill to prevent a refusal by anybody to buy anything. All that it says is that the people
producing or selling a particular article shal not make combinations to advance the price of the
necessaries of life." Id A brief colloquy ensued, and finally Sherman asked George if he con-
strued the bill to prohibit "an agreement among several people not to drink whiskey or brandy."
When George in effect answered "yes," Sherman, perhaps by this time frustrated and disbelieving,
asked no further questions. Id
60. Id at 1167, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38 at 69.
61. 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 102, and in, I
E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 123.
62. Id at 2561, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 146, and in, 1 E. KINTNER,
supra note 38, at 160.
63. Id at 2561-62, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 146-47, andin, I E. KJNT-
NER, supra note 38 at 160-61.
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that the Farmers' Alliance and the Knights of Labor would not come
under that clause; but if they did, the way to prevent all such organiza-
tions is to strike down first the organizations which gave rise and neces-
sity to this local labor association."'  Reagan's answer did not fully
respond, however, to a point made by George concerning both Sher-
man's and Reagan's bill. George had observed that "[t]he Knights of
Labor . . .are an organization composed of citizens of the different
States of the Union, probably of every State of the Union. The object
of that organization. . . is to increase the price of their wages. Now,
increasing the price of wages has a tendency, in the language of this
bill, to increase the price of the product of their labor."65 Thus, George
wondered why the activities of the Knights of Labor would not be pro-
scribed by the bills. Sherman, perhaps feeling pressed by the argu-
ments made by Teller and George, offered his views:
Now, let us look at it. The bill . . . does not interfere in the slightest
degree with voluntary associations made to affect public opinion to ad-
vance the interests of the particular trade or occupation. It does not
interfere with the Farmers' Alliance at all, because that is an associa-
tion of farmers to advance their interests and to improve the growth
and manner of production of their crops and to secure intelligent
growth and to introduce new methods. No organizations in this coun-
try can be more beneficial in their character than Farmers' Alliances
and farmers' associations. They are not business combinations. . .And
so the combinations of workingmen to promote their interests, promote
their welfare, and increase their pay if you please, to get their fair share
in the division of production, are not affected in the slightest degree,
nor can they be included in the words or intent of the bill as now
reported.6 6
Although Sherman's response was no doubt inadequate to mollify the
bill's critics, it evidences his concern with product market competition,
the kind of competition that "business combinations" restrain. Sher-
man did not believe his bill could be applied to labor, and he thought it
unnecessary to state this expressly since his bill could not reach, consis-
tent with congressional power, the employer-employee relationship. If,
as drafted, his bill did reach some labor combinations, Sherman defi-
nitely did not intend this result. As far as Sherman was concerned, his
bill had no applicability to labor market restraints, and plainly Sher-
man did not contemplate his bill being used to promote competition in
labor markets.
64. Id at 2562, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 147, and in, 1 E. KINTNER,
supra note 38, at 161.
65. Id at 2561, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 146, and in, I E. KINTNER,
supra note 38, at 160.
66. Id at 2562, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 148, and in, I E. KINTNER,
supra note 38, at 162 (emphasis added).
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Although George led the attack on Sherman's bill, George did not
oppose the principle of antitrust legislation, for he had in fact intro-
duced an antitrust bill of his own. Moreover, George's concern that the
bill would injure labor organizations was not predicated on a broader
view than Sherman's view of Congress' power under the commerce
clause. Actually, of all the Senators, George had the most limited view
of the commerce power because he thought that legislation under the
commerce power had to serve commercial ends. In George's view,
Sherman's bill did not regulate "commerce," but was instead directed
at agreements entered into before or after the actual transportation be-
tween states and had no relationship to that "commerce."67 Thus,
George's attack upon Sherman's bill was actually a two-fold argument:
(1) the bill was unconstitutional; (2) if it were construed to be constitu-
tional, it would be used to destroy beneficial organizations.68 George's
argument, coupled with the fact that Sherman's bill was amended to
exempt labor organizations and that this "labor proviso" was subse-
quently deleted from the bill prior to passage, has created doubt as to
whether Congress intended the Sherman Act to apply to labor
organizations.69
It is not necessary to resolve this argument for the purpose of de-
termining whether the Sherman Act applies to restraints on labor mar-
ket competition, because Congress, even if it did intend to apply the
Sherman Act to labor unions, did so because of what unions might do
to injure competition in the product market. Thus, even if one con-
cludes that the Sherman Act was intended to apply to labor organiza-
tions, it does not follow that the Sherman Act applies to restraints on
labor market competition. George, the principal critic, realized that the
reason labor would be subjected to a constitutional bill is that "increas-
67. Id at 1768, 1770-7 1, reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 79-80, 83-85, and in,
I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 101-02, 105-07; Bork, supra note 41, at 34 n.82; H. THORELLI,
supra note 38, at 178. George stated at one point in the debates:
This power is claimed here, as I understand it, not because there is any actual commerce
between States or citizens of States, but because the subjects to which this bill relates
may afterwards become the subjects of interstate commerce.
20 CONG. REC. 1461 (1889), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 84.
After quoting extensively from Supreme Court cases such as Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14
How.) 567 (1852), and Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, (1886), George stated:
[Ilf anything is settled in the constitutional law of this country it is that an article of
commerce, an article of merchandise, does not become the subject of Congressional ju-
risdiction under the commercial clause of the Constitution until it has actually become
the subject of interstate or foreign commerce, and that this does not begin, though it may
be intended for that purpose, until transportation has actually commenced.
20 CONG. REC. 1461 (1889), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 86.
68. See id at 1462 (1889), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 88.
69. Although the matter is not free from all doubt, a substantial case can be made that the
Fifty-first Congress did not intend for the Sherman Act to apply to farmer and labor organiza-
tions. See H. THORELLI, supra note 38, at 231-32; E. BERMAN, LABOR AND THE SHERMAN ACT
11-54 (1930).
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ing the price of wages has a tendency, in the language of this bill, to
increase the price of the product of their labor. "70 In other words,
George reasoned that labor unions can have an effect in the product
market, andfor that reason their activities would be condemned by the
proposed antitrust legislation, if it were deemed constitutional.71
B. Section 6 of the Clayton Act
Although there was no compelling indication that the Congress
which enacted the Sherman Act intended it to apply to labor organiza-
tions or to labor market restraints generally, courts sometimes held that
concerted activities involving employees violated section 1.12 In 1908,
the Supreme Court held in Loewe v. Lawlor73 that the Sherman Act
was applicable to labor unions. Arguably, the Court so held because
the activity of the union had the purpose of restraining the product
market, as the Court itself stated thirty years later.74 Regrettably, the
Court did not explain the decision in those terms.7 5 Rather, the Court
broadly stated that the Act applied to labor combinations, a proposi-
tion which, if applied literally, would prohibit all joint employee activ-
ity. The threat to labor from this decision and others which followed
it76 caused Congress in 1914 to enact section 6 of the Clayton Act to
make clear what it thought had been clear when the Sherman Act was
passed.77 In section 6, Congress declared that "the labor of a human
70. 21 CONG. REc. 2561 (1890), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 146, andin, 1
E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 160.
7 1. That this was George's logic is evident from the antitrust bill which he introduced in the
Fifty-first Congress. See S. 6, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1889), reprintedin S. Doc. No. 147, supra note
39, at 411. Section l of S. 6 prohibited all contracts, etc. preventing or tending to prevent "full and
free competition in the importation, transportation, manufacturing, or sale of any article of mer-
chandise, or which shall have the effect of advancing the cost of any such article to the consumer."
This provision by its terms did not proscribe employer restraints in labor markets, since labor is
not an "article of merchandise" and employers would not restrain a labor market for the purpose
of "advancing the cost of any such article to the consumer." George inserted a proviso in § I of S.
6 excluding "arrangements, agreements, or combinations between laborers made with the view of
lessening the number of hours of labor, or of increasing their wages" presumably because he
thought the activities of these organizations could inhibit competition in the product market. The
same point can be made with regard to other bills introduced in the Fifty-first Congress, first
session. See, e.g., H.R. 91, reprinted in SEN. Doc. No. 147, supra note 39, at 417.
72. See E. BERMAN, supra note 69, at 57-76.
73. 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
74. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
75. The Court did not give a fair reading to the legislative history and otherwise failed to
understand the nature of the issue before it. See Winter, Collective Bargaining and Competition.:
The Application ofAntitrust Standards to Union Activities, 73 YALE L.J. 14, 31-32; E. BERMAN,
supra note 69, at 77-87.
76. See E. BERMAN, upra note 66, at 87-98.
77. The bill which ultimately became the Clayton Act was introduced in the House on April
14, 1914. H.R. 15657, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914), reprinted in 1 E. KiNTER, supra note 38, at
1080-88. The House Committee on the Judiciary explained that the purpose of § 7, which would
later be amended and become § 6, was "to make clear certain questions about which doubt has
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being is not an article of commerce" and that
[n]othing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor. . . organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help. . . or to forbid or restrain individual mem-
bers of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate ob-
jects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be
held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint
of trade, under the antitrust laws.78
The thrust of the debate has led some to conclude that section 6
was designed only to provide a limited exemption from the Sherman
Act for labor union activity. It is true that most of the debate on sec-
tion 6 in both houses of Congress focused on the need to free labor
from court decisions making labor organizations subject to the antitrust
laws. 79  To the extent that there was controversy in the Congress, it
concerned whether the language in the proposed bill was sufficiently
strong to ensure that labor would not be subjected to the antitrust
laws.8" Throughout the debate, members of both the House and the
Senate repeatedly stated that it was not the intent of the drafters of the
Sherman Act to apply antitrust principles to labor groups.8 ' Even the
arisen," namely, whether labor and other types of organizations are within the scope of the Sher-
man Act. REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 627, pt. 1, 63rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914), reprintedin I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1095. As reported from the
committee, the scope of the exception was limited to protecting specified organizations, including
labor. What is now the first sentence of § 6 was added later. See infra notes 86 and accompanying
text.
Several antitrust bills that included provisions specifically exempting labor from the Sherman
Act were introduced in various sessions of the Congress prior to 1914. Although one of these bills
passed the House, none of them ever became law. See E. BERMAN, supra note 69, at 84-86.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1980).
79. Rep. Sherwood and Sen. Ashurst each placed in the Record a list of 101 cases in which
courts had applied the Sherman Act to labor. 51 CONG. REc. 9173-74 (1914) reprinted in I E.
KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1278-81; id at 13665-66, reprintedin I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at
1778-80.
80. Eg., REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Minority Views), H.R.
REP. No. 627, pt. 3, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9-11 (1914), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at
1158-59.
81. 51 CONo. REC. 9170 (1914), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1271 (Rep.
Bryan); id at 9171-72, reprintedin 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1272-74 (Rep. Sherwood); id at
9245-46, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1330-33 (Rep. MacDonald); id at 9161,
reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at (Rep. McGillicuddy); id at 9540, reprinted in I E.
KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1509 (Rep. Webb); id at 9540, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note
38, at 1510 (Rep. Henry); id at 9543, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1517 (Rep.
Bartlett); id at 9547, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1525 (Rep. Towner); id at 9549,
reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1530 (Rep. Johnson); id at 9551, reprinted in I E.
KINTNER supra note 38, at 1533 (Rep. Hensley); id at 9554, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note
38, at 1541 (Rep. Barkley); fcisid. at 9565, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1566 Rep.
Lewis); id at 13663, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, upra note 38, at 1772 Sen. Ashurst); Id at 13848,
reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1800 (Sen. Culberson); id at 13844, reprinted in I E.
KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1791 (Sen. Thompson); id at 13967, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra
note 38, at 1885 (Sen. Hollis); id at 13969, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1889-90
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title of section 6 in the United States Code, "Antitrust laws not applica-
ble to labor organizations,"82 suggests that section 6 was drafted only to
provide a limited exemption from the Sherman Act for labor union
activity. Unquestionably, section 6 does at least this much. National
labor policy, as it has developed, gives unions certain protections not
given to employers, so that the resulting balance of power will make
collective bargaining effective. That section 6 immunizes from the anti-
trust laws legitimate union activity and multi-employer activity inci-
dental to collective bargaining is beyond question.
Still, even if it were true that the text of section 6 provides an ex-
emption from the Sherman Act only for labor organizations, it would
not follow that promoting labor market competition is a goal of the
Sherman Act. When adopted, the Sherman Act was intended to pro-
mote only product market competition. However, courts had permitted
the Act to be used as a weapon against unions without requiring em-
ployer-plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged conduct of unions
had anticompetitive effects in product markets. It was this perversion
of congressional intent that required legislative correction. Thus, it is
understandable that Congress focused on providing an exemption for
labor organizations. In short, Congress' failure in 1914 to include an
exemption for employer activities affecting labor is meaningless if no
one at that time thought that the Sherman Act prohibited such em-
ployer activities.
In any event, section 6 does not function solely to immunize activi-
ties of labor organizations. First, as a matter of ordinary language, the
opening sentence of the section, which declares that "the labor of a
human being".is not an "article of commerce," excludes the selling and
buying of labor from the scope of the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act
applies to the sale and exchange of goods and services in the product
market. In the first sentence of section 6, Congress stated that the labor
of a human being is not one of those products sold and exchanged to
which the Sherman Act applies.8 3
(Sen. Hughes). But see id at 13908, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1838 (Sen.
Pomerene).
82. See 15 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp. IV 1980).
83. Another way to phrase this proposition is as follows: the buying and selling of labor is
not Sherman Act "commerce." In response to this specific proposition, it should be noted that
litigants have sometimes defended against applying the Sherman Act to various business activities
on the ground that, for one reason or another, the activities are not § I "commerce." This defense,
when asserted, has not fared well in the Supreme Court. Eg., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 785-88 (1975). Moreover, claims that challenged conduct is within an implied exemp-
tion to the Act have not been viewed with favor. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659,
682 (1975); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963); Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357-58 (1963). However, none of the cases in which an antitrust
exemption was refused rested on explicit statutory language stating that the challenged activities
are outside the scope of the Sherman Act. E.g., Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. § 62 (Supp. IV 1980);
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Second, there are several indications in the legislative history of
section 6 that the plain language means what it says. Some members of
Congress apparently perceived a distinction between product markets
and labor markets, intending the Sherman Act to apply to the former
but not to the latter. For example, Senator Jones, somewhat propheti-
cally urging the enactment of labor legislation, emphasized that the la-
bor legislation should apply to the labor market, and the Sherman Act
should be left to apply to the commercial market, as it had always been
intended:
Let the Sherman law affect trade and commerce and those who deal in
and with trade and commerce as it, in fact, was intended when it was
passed. Take labor and labor organizations out from under the law
entirely, and let us formulate a statute governing labor and its organi-
zations. . . we should treat labor and its relations to interstate trade as
really an independent proposition. . . we must define the rights of la-
bor so far as it affects commerce. . . we should separate it and legislate
for it, of course in its relation to interstate trade and commerce, but not
treat it . . . as an article of commerce, because it is not an article of
commerce. It is no part of commerce. It is not a commodity at all.84
Jones' belief that labor is neither a "commodity" nor an "article of
commerce," a belief shared by others in the House and Senate,8 5 is
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (Supp. IV 1980); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (Supp.
IV 1980). Because of § 6, the buying and selling of labor stands on a different footing than other
activities for which an "implied exception" from the Sherman Act has been sought.
84. 51 CONG. REC. 14019 (1914), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1942-43. See
also id at 14013, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1931 (Jones, stating that "Trade and
commerce are made up of articles or commodities; not of labor, but the products of labor").
85. In debate in the House on § 6, Congressman Kelly stated that the bill recognized "the
fundamental difference between human labor and the products of labor." 51 CONG. REc. 9086
(1914), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, upra note 38, at 1221. Congressman MacDonald agreed that
"[hiuman labor is not a commodity ... ." Id at 2149, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38,
at 1339. Congressman Crosser recognized the same distinction:
The evil that the bill is intended to correct is the monopoly of the natural resources...
But no man has any natural or moral right of ownership in another man's body or his
power to labor, and therefore no man has any right to say that another shall or shall not
work or to say that he shall not consult with his fellows about working or refusing to
work or in regard to the terms of employment so long as the conference is free from
violence. The same right as to his labor, whether manual or mental, must be conceded to
the individual employer or if a corporation be the employer, then the officials of such
corporation have the right to consult with one another or with like officials of some or all
other corporations in regard to the terms upon which they will do their work. This,
however, is an entirely different thing from permitting a monopoly of the resources of the
earth.
Id at 9556, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1545. Congressman Lewis referred to the
error committed by some:
of considering labor as a commodity . . . . But there is this distinction between labor
and a barrel of oil, a commodity; Labor is never in truth a commodity; . . . While a
barrel ofoil is not only a commodity in the market, it is a commodity before the courts; it
is a commodity before the legislature. The legal attribute of a commodity is property
... . The rules that are rationally applicable to property can seldom be justly applied
to the man.
Id at 9566, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1566. Congressman Murdock stated "I
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particularly striking in light of the fact that only fifteen years earlier
most proposals for antitrust legislation, including Sherman's, had
sought to prohibit restraints on competition in "commodities," "articles
of commerce," or similarly described tangible things. Jones' statement,
then, can be read as reaffirming Congress' intention that the Sherman
Act apply to restraints on product market competition.
Particularly significant are the statements of Senator Cummins,
who was the author of what eventually became the first sentence of
section 6.86 In Senate debate, Senator Cummins stated:
We have been debating this bill, and I have heard the subject debated a
thousand times upon the hypothesis that the labor of a human being is
of the same quality and order as a bale of cotton, a barrel of flour, or a
bushel of corn. I repudiate the parallel and the comparison. It is be-
cause we have been in the habit of thinking of labor as a commodity
that we have fallen into many mistakes which now impair and mar, I
think, both legislation and judicial opinion. The labor of a human be-
ing, whether it be of the mind or of the hand, is not a commodity ....
Labor is not a commodity; it is not an article of commerce; and when
the Constitution of the United States gave to Congress the authority to
regulate commerce among the States, it did not give it the right to regu-
late labor, the disposition of the energy of the human being.8 7
In the same speech, he explained that a contract among manufacturers
to fix product price
believe, in the first instance, that labor is not a commodity." Id at 9568, reprinted in 1 E. KINT-
NER, supra note 38, at 1572. Senator Borah interpreted court decisions he discussed to "clearly
recognize the distinction between a commodity and labor." Id at 13924, reprinted in I E. KINT-
NER, supra note 38, at 1874. Senator Thomas said that "labor is not a commodity, and, not being
a commodity, should not be made subject to the provisions of the antitrust law." Id at 14022,
reprintedin I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1950. Senator Kern stated "I think the time has come
when there should be a strong legislative declaration to the effect that the labor of a human being
is not a commodity or an article of commerce..." Id at 14587, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra
note 38, at 2372. Senator Pittman said that the part of Senator Cummins' amendment "which
describes labor and differentiates it from a commodity is very excellent." Id, reprinted in I E.
KINTNER, supra note 38, at 2372.
86. Sen. Cummins proposed a substitute for § 7 at the end of the Senate debates on August
19, 1914. 51 CONG. REC. 13983 (1914), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1920. The
amendment, which included the phrase "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or an
article of commerce," was allowed to lie on the table, id, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note
38, at 1920, and it was again offered to the Senate as a substitute for § 7 on September 1, 1914. Id
at 14546-47, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 2365. The amendment was debated and
rejected on September 2, 1914. Id at 14585-90, reprinted in I E. KI TNER, supra note 38, at 2366-
78. Immediately thereafter, Senator Culberson proposed an amendment to insert into § 7 only the
words "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." The amendment
was agreed to without a roll call. Id at 14590-91, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at
2378-79. While the "Culberson amendment" became the first sentence of § 6, those words were
written by Senator Cummins. Indeed, Senator Cummins said during the debate on his amend-
ment that if his amendment failed, he would move the inclusion of the "Culberson amendment."
Id at 14586, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 2368. Culberson apparently beat Cum-
mins to the punch.
87. 51 CONG. REC. 13979-80 (1914), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1912.
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would be a violation of the antitrust law before a single act was per-
formed .... That contract has to do with commodities, with the sub-
jects of commerce, with articles that are transported from place to place
and bought and sold in the markets of the world.
88
Cummins shared the prevailing belief that Congress' commerce power
was limited, but in a colloquy with Senator McCumber he left no doubt
that he viewed the sale of labor to an employer as a transaction funda-
mentally different from the ordinary sale of a good:
Mr. McCUMBER. Mr. President, may I ask the Senator from Iowa if
any court has ever held or ever intimated that the sale by a man of his
labor is a commercial act?
Mr. CUMMINS. No; I think no court has ever so held.
Mr. McCUMBER. Does the Senator really think there is danger of a
court ever holding that the mere hiring of a man to an employer is an
act of commerce?
Mr. CUMMINS. There are a great many opinions which contain dis-
cussions of the subject and which will be found to embrace a course of
reasoning which, if carried to its logical end, would put labor precisely
where you put a bale of cotton or a bushel of wheat; but those reasons
have never found expression in any decision. It never has been so de-
cided. I confess that I have shared the apprehension that some students
of the subject have--that the courts may do that in the future.89
Cummins, realizing courts might decide one day that the employer-
employee relationship is "in commerce," intended to exclude "the sale
of a man of his labor" and "the hiring of a man to an employer" from
the definition of the "commerce" regulated by the Sherman Act.
Attributing such an intent to Cummins is consistent with the lan-
guage of Supreme Court decisions with which Cummins was no doubt
well acquainted. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits contracts, etc.
"in restraint of trade or commerce;" if labor or any other item is not an
"article of commerce," transactions involving that item are obviously
not "commerce." 90 In Paul v. Virginia,9 1 the Court held that "[insur-
88. Id at 13980, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1913.
89. Id at 14018-19, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1942.
90. Although "trade" and "commerce" are disjunctive, there is no basis for concluding that
"restraint of trade" has a meaning independent of "reatraint of commerce." As used in 1890, the
terms "trade" and "commerce" were largely synonymous, H. THORELLI, supra note 38, at 222, and
there is no reason to believe that they are used in different senses in § 1. See Atlantic Cleaners &
Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434 (1932) (in § 1, "it may be that the words 'trade and
commerce' are there to be regarded as synonymous"). In Apex Hosiery, the Court stated that the
words "or commerce among the several states" did not refer to a different kind of restraint to be
prohibited by the Sherman Act but merely constituted "the means used to relate the prohibited
restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional purposes." Apex Hosiery v. Leader,
310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940).
But even if "trade" and "commerce" are assumed to have separate meanings, § 6 still would
exempt all matters involving labor. Reading § I in the disjunctive, it prohibits contracts, etc., "in
restraint of trade" and "in restraint of commerce." Section 6 of the Clayton Act provides that 'the
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." "Commodity" is the ana-
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ance] contracts are not articles of commerce" and "are not commodi-
ties."92 Until overruled by the Supreme Court in 1944, 93 this holding,
which is nearly identical to the first sentence of section 6, precluded the
application of the Sherman Act to conspiracies fixing insurance rates.
94
It is entirely possible that Senator Cummins, a lawyer who demon-
strated his familiarity with judicial decisions in his speeches in the Sen-
ate, obtained the inspiration for his amendment from Paul v. Virginia
and those cases following it. One case which quoted extensively from
Paul v. Virginia, holding that a tax on insurance was not a tax on inter-
state commerce, was decided in 1913, shortly before the debates on the
Clayton Act. 95
From the proposition that "the labor of a human being" is neither
a "commodity" nor "an article of commerce, ' 9 6 Cummins reasoned
that an organization of laborers could not itself be a restraint of trade
or commerce within the meaning of the Sherman Act. 97 However, he
felt that labor organizations, or individuals within those organizations,
could engage in activity that restrained commerce:
Mark you, I am not now considering what the individual members of a
labor organization may do. I am not considering how they may impede
commerce in the execution of the objects of their organization.9 8
In recognizing that labor organizations were not restraints of trade or
commerce but that they could have effects in "commerce," Cummins
stated the essence of the distinction between labor markets and product
markets. Cummins concluded his last speech before the vote on his
amendment as follows:
Recapitulating, my substitute recognizes the high quality of labor, dis-
tinguishes the power, whether mental or physical, of the human being
to render service to his fellow men from the commodity which may be
produced through that service. 99
logue of "restraint of trade," since commodities are traded; "article of commerce" is the analogue
of "restraint of commerce," since "articles of commerce"move in "commerce." If labor is not a
commodity to be "traded," labor cannot be the object of restraint of trade. Similarly, if labor is
not an article of commerce, transactions involving that item are obviously not "commerce."
When analyzed in this way, one must still conclude that § 6 of the Clayton Act was intended to
remove as fully as possible matters involving labor from the reach of the Sherman Act.
91. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1863).
92. Id at 183.
93. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
94. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 714 (N.D. Ga.
1943), rev'd, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
95. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495, 502-04 (1913).
96. 51 CONG. REC. 13980 (1914), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1912.
97. Id at 13979, 13980, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1910-11, 1912.
98. Id at 13979, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1911. He made the same point
earlier in the debate. Id at 13969, reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note 38 at 1891 ("I am not
saying, of course, that the members of a labor union can not do something that will restrain
trade").
99. Id at 14596, reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 2369.
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In short, the author of the first sentence of section 6 intended that labor
organizations be exempt from the Sherman Act. But he sought to se-
cure this objective by declaring that labor-the work performed by
human beings-is not subject to the Sherman Act.
Third, even if the first sentence of section 6 had not been enacted,
the second sentence of section 6 standing alone was thought by some to
be broad enough to exclude the sale of labor to an employer from the
reach of the Sherman Act. In the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
report on a draft of section 6 without the first sentence which Cummins
later proposed, the Committee expressed its view that section 6 meant
that "labor is not, and ought not to be regarded as a commodity within
the purview of the antitrust laws.' In the Committee's view, this
abbreviated version of section 6, limited in that it referred only to "or-
ganizations," was still broad enough to mean that labor matters gener-
ally are not within the scope of the antitrust laws. This reinforces the
proposition that Congress intended to apply the Sherman Act only to
restraints in product markets.
To summarize, in the first two decades after the Sherman Act was
passed, courts supported the use of the Act to frustrate efforts of labor
organizations to improve labor conditions. Congress enacted section 6
of the Clayton Act to rectify this unintended use of the federal antitrust
law. In the context of rapidly developing national labor policies, sec-
tion 6 has had its greatest legal significance in the collective bargaining
setting. If one focuses on this application of section 6, however, it is
easy to overlook the original purposes for which section 6 was enacted.
What Congress did in 1914, rather than providing support for an argu-
ment that the Sherman Act was designed to promote competition in
labor markets, provides evidence that Congress perceived a distinction
between labor markets and product markets and that Congress in-
tended the Sherman Act to reach the latter but not the former.
Furthermore, the confficting policies of national labor law and an-
titrust law would make antitrust law a crude tool for cultivating compe-
tition among employers in labor markets. We now examine the policy
of the Sherman Act.
III
POLICY OF THE SHERMAN ACT
On many occasions, the Supreme Court has stated that competi-
tion is the premise on which the Sherman Act is based. In Northern
Pacifc Railway v. United States,' ° the Court described the Act as a
100. S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., 46 (1914), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note
38, at 1748.
101. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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"comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free
and unfettered competition as the rule of trade.""2 More recently, in
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,t°3 the Court
explained that the "Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that
ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices but also bet-
ter goods and services. . . . Even assuming occasional exceptions to
the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy pre-
cludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or
bad."'" The question addressed in this Article could be phrased this
way: does the pro-competition premise of the Sherman Act apply to all
activities of firms, or does it not apply to some activities of firms, such
as employers' activities in labor markets?
As a threshold matter, it is worth noting that the premise on which
the Sherman Act is based is not the premise underlying national labor
policy. Indeed, "the congressional policy favoring collective bargain-
ing" under the National Labor Relations Act 0 5 demonstrates that fed-
eral policy in the market for labor is not premised on "unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces"' or a "free opportunity to select
among alternative offers."'0 7 Collective bargaining seeks to improve
the lot of labor through conscious creation of "a system of bilateral
monopoly" in which the power of business is balanced by the power of
labor.0 8 The very existence of collective bargaining depends, in many
instances, upon limiting competition among employers and creating
"significant anti-competitive incentives in both labor and manage-
ment." ' In addition, the Supreme Court recognized more than forty
years ago that federal legislation "setting up minimum wage and hour
standards" demonstrates that "combinations of workers eliminating
competition among themselves and restricting competition among their
employers based on wage cutting are not contrary to public policy.""
Although national labor policy requires restrictions upon competi-
102. Id at 4.
103. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
104. Id at 695. See Association of Gen. Contractors of California, Inc., v. California State
Council of Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 908-09 (1983) ("The Sherman Act was enacted to assure
customers the benefits of price competition").
105. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975).
106. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 4.
107. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 695.
108. Winter, supra note 75, at 16, 18 n.18.
109. Id
110. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 504 n.24 (1940). In certain industries, such as
textile manufacturing and vegetable canning, a minimum wage may fix most wage levels directly
because most employees are paid no more than the minimum wage. In other industries, a mini-
mum wage sets wage levels indirectly because of the need to maintain the same relation between
minimum wage jobs and jobs requiring higher skills.
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tion in labor markets, it does not necessarily follow that employers
should be free to engage in connected anticompetitive concerted mar-
ket activities directed against labor. Indeed, some might argue that,
notwithstanding the anticompetitive premise of national labor policy,
employers should compete to pay higher wages and thereby improve
the lot of labor, at least where labor is unorganized and consequently
unable to demand a higher wage based on increased bargaining
power."' Therefore, the pro-competition premise of the Sherman Act
is viewed as applying to employers' activities generally, including what
they do in labor markets, and this premise is overcome only when Con-
gress explicitly approves practices that restrict competition among em-
ployers. 11 2 Such a specific exemption exists, under this argument, in
section 6 of the Clayton Act, 3 which is then read as exempting only
joint employer activities incidental to bargaining with labor
organizations. 1 14
Several problems arise with the foregoing argument. First, despite
the expansive language of section 1 of the Sherman Act, not all con-
certed activities involving commercial transactions are within its cover-
age.'5 As demonstrated in Part II, this indicates that the premise on
which the argument is based--that the Sherman Act applies to all ac-
tivities of firms, including their activities as employers in labor mar-
kets-is incorrect. Second, whatever may be the merit of a policy of
11. For example, one can begin with the assumption that the principal--and perhaps sole-
purpose of federal antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 61-66 (1978), R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1976). In this situation, one might conclude
that promoting competition among employers for the services of employees is desirable. Wage
fixing will cause some labor to drift into lower valued employment, thereby wasting valuable
resources. However, claiming that the Sherman Act was intended to promote efficiency in all
economic relationships regardless of their nature attributes too broad a purpose to the Sherman
Act, and the Act has never been so construed. See supra text accompanying notes 38-64; Elzinga,
The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 1191, 1213 (1977); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Discipline." What Are the
Sources of Wisdomfor Antitrust? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1218-23 (1977); MCI Communications
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 702 F.2d 1081, 1177 (7th Cir. 1982) (Wood, J., dissenting).
112. It is this kind of policy argument which could be asserted in defense of decisions such as
Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See infra notes 221-52 and accompa-
nying text.
113. Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
114. See Altman, supra note 22, at 142-50. Such a limited reading of the scope of § 6 was
criticized earlier in this Article. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
115. E.g., Allied Int'l, Inv. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 640 F.2d 1368 (1st Cir.
1981) (union's politically motivated refusal to handle cargoes of ships engaged in trade with Soviet
Union is not a restraint of trade in violation of Sherman Act); Missouri v. National Org. for
Women, 620 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (convention boycott of
states which had not ratified Equal Rights Amendment "beyond the scope and intent of the Sher-
man Act"); Miller & Son Paving, Inc. v. Wrightstown Township Civic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 1268,
1271 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (concerted effort of defendants to obtain township order closing down plain-
tiffs business "is simply not the kind [of conduct) that the Sherman Act was designed to
regulate").
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promoting employer competition in labor markets, no court has ever
announced it as a goal of federal antitrust policy. There is no federally
articulated policy that wages should be as high as possible comparable
to the clearly articulated policy that prices should be as low as possible.
In fact, articulated national policies exist that both restrict em-
ployer competition in labor markets and actively encourage wage uni-
formity. If it is federal policy that employers should compete to pay
higher wages, that policy is well hidden. For example, the Davis-Ba-
con Act" 6 requires that contractors working on federal buildings or
other public works projects agree to pay their "laborers and mechan-
ics" no less than "wages that are determined by the Secretary of Labor
to be prevailing for the corresponding classes of laborers and mechan-
ics employed on projects of a character similar to the contract work
. . . ." The required prevailing wage is determined by a wage survey
conducted by the government. 17 Similar requirements are imposed on
contractors providing goods or services to the federal government." 8
These provisions restrict free competition among employers in the mar-
ket for labor and are intended to promote wage uniformity."'
Another illustration of the federal policy favoring wage uniformity
116. 40 U.S.C. § 276a (Supp. IV 1980).
117. 29 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1983). On May 28, 1982, the Secretary of Labor promulgated new rules
regarding the procedures for predetermination of wage rates. The new rules did not eliminate the
wage survey conducted by the Government. .d In any event, on July 22, 1982, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined implementation of the new regulations.
Building & Constr. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 543 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (D.D.C. 1982).
118. The Walsh-Healy Act, 41 U.S.C. § 35 (Supp. IV 1980) requires that contractors provid-
ing materials or supplies in excess of $10,000 to the government agree to pay "not less than the
minimum wages as determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the prevailing minimum wages for
persons employed on similar work or in the particular or similar industries or groups of industries
currently operating in the locality" where the materials or supplies are to be manufactured or
furnished. The purpose of this provision is "to make certain that the United States, in contracts
for materials for its own use, [does] not patronize firms paying [wages] lower than those generally
being paid in the industry." Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 518, 520 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1964).
The Service Contract Labor Standards Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351 (Supp. IV 1980) requires any
contractor furnishing services in excess of $2,500 to the government to pay wages and provide
fringe benefits "in accordance with the prevailing rates for such employees in the locality." If any
such employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the contractor must pay those
rates, including "prospective [wage/fringe benefit] increases." 41 U.S.C. § 35 1 (a)(1), (a)(2). This
Act, like the Walsh-Healy Act, is "designed to ensure that service employees working on govern-
ment contracts are not paid wages below the prevailing wages being paid in the locality by non-
government contractors." International Ass'n of Machinists v. Hodgson, 515 F.2d 373, 375 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). To check compliance with both the Walsh-Healy and Service Contract Acts, the gov-
ernment conducts wage surveys. Wirtz v. Baldor Elec. Co., 337 F.2d at 522; International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Hodgson, 515 F.2d at 376.
119. E.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 504 n.24 (1940); International Union of
Operating Eng'rs, Local 627 v. Arthur, 355 F. Supp. 7, 8 (W.D. Okla.), affd, 480 F.2d 603 (10th
Cir. 1973). These statutes prevent contractors from securing bids on federal projects by basing
their bids on unreasonably low wages for labor. To this extent, the statutes establish a floor below
which wages cannot fall, much like a minimum wage. Yet, in mandating that wages paid by
government contractors shall not fall below this floor, Congress has reinforced the prevailing
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is the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1970.120 Under that statute,
pay rates for federal employees are to "be comparable with private en-
terprise pay rates for the same levels of work."'' Implementing this
requirement involves the use of elaborate wage surveys.' 22 The federal
pay rate is set at the average shown by the survey, so that federal pay
rates have "the least impact-more or less neutral-in the labor mar-
ket."' 23 Similar requirements of pay comparability are imposed on re-
cipients of federal job training funds, 24 where the wages to be paid are
also based on detailed wage surveys.
125
Other federal statutes also tend to limit employer competition in
the labor market, although the effect is less obvious. For example, sen-
iority systems tend to preclude the free movement of labor and to make
labor less responsive to wage differentials. Bona fide seniority systems
are sanctioned by federal anti-discrimination legislation. 126 Vesting re-
quirements of pension plans may have a similar effect, and these re-
quirements are also sanctioned by federal law.' 27  Denying
unemployment benefits to persons who quit their jobs simply because
of low pay may also tend to restrict competition in the labor market. 28
In short, a wide variety of federal and state laws eliminates or re-
stricts employer competition in the labor market. The premise of the
Sherman Act is open and free competition, but there is no articulated
federal policy that there should be open and free competition among
employers in labor markets. Where Congress has spoken, it has said
that wages should be uniform at some level above a minimum rate.
Thus, until Congress expresses some other intent, the articulated goals
of the Sherman Act do not represent public policy in the labor market.
Public policy in the labor market is defined by an entirely different
body of law and, at least for the present, is based on fundamentally
"tacit" wage, whatever its level may be. Thus, these statutes encourage wage uniformity, rather
than creating a climate in which employers will be encouraged to bid up the price of labor.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 5301 (Supp. IV 1980).
121. 5 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
122. Stelluto, Federal Pay Comparability: Facts to Temper the Debate, MONTHLY LAB. REV.
18 (June 1979). With respect to prevailing rate employees, which includes employees of almost all
Executive agencies and the armed forces, the statute requires wage surveys. 5 U.S.C. § 5343(c)
(1976). See Rogers v. Laird, 319 F. Supp. 1, 2 (E.D. Va. 1970).
123. Stelluto, supra note 122, at 20; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Camp-
bell, 659 F.2d 157, 158 (D.C. Cit. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981) ("The wage surveys are
intended to aid the Government in keeping wages for federal employees roughly in line with
wages paid to comparably classified employees in the private sector").
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 826(a)(l)(b), 917(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
125. Greene, Geographic Wage Indexingfor CETA and Medicare, MONTHLY LAB. REV. 15
(Sept. 1980).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (Supp. IV 1980).
128. Most unemployment compensation plans deny benefits under these circumstances. See
Annot. 95 A.L.R.3d 449 (1979); Annot., 88 A.L.R.3d 274 (1978).
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different assumptions.'29
This is the way it should be; labor market policy should be left to
the labor laws. If the free-market premise of the Sherman Act were
applied indiscriminately to the labor market, the result would be dis-
ruption of national labor policies developed under the assumption that
the principles of the Sherman Act do not apply to the labor market.
For example, if the antitrust laws apply in the labor market, could a
laid-off new employee challenge a seniority system as an unlawful ex-
clusive dealing agreement? A system providing for recall in order of
seniority is an agreement to hire one person rather than another, re-
gardless of their respective merits. It is, therefore, very similar to an
agreement to deal in a single product without regard to the merits of
another.
The possible disruptions are almost endless. Are pension plan
vesting requirements illegal tying arrangements? By having a vesting
requirement, an employer essentially imposes on employees a require-
ment to deal only with that employer to obtain the benefits of the pen-
sion plan. In principle, this arrangement is similar to conditioning the
loan of money on the purchase of goods from the lender, a practice
held potentially illegal in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp. 130 Could a non-union employee claim that a federal contractor's
practice of paying prevailing wages is illegal price-fixing?
Even if these questions could be answered, the application of alien
antitrust principles to the labor market would confound long-estab-
lished principles designed to protect and regulate labor. 3 1 There is no
federal policy generally favoring competition in the labor market; in
fact, to the extent an articulated federal policy exists, it favors anti-
competitive combinations of employees and, incidentally, collective
bargaining of employers. Moreover, there is no articulated federal pol-
icy favoring competition among employers in labor markets. Perhaps
employers should be encouraged to compete for the services of labor,
but the articulated federal policies identifiable in this area do not en-
courage such competition. The Sherman Act's broad pro-competitive
premise, if applied generally to employer activities in labor markets,
129. That distinction was recognized, albeit somewhat prophetically, by Senator Jones in the
debate over the provision which became § 6 of the Clayton Act. See supra text accompanying
note 84.
130. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
131. One might attempt to argue, for example, that the foregoing examples do not involve a
combination between two or more actors, but instead involve an intra-enterprise conspiracy. See
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 323-29. Stretching this doctrine might provide a vehicle for ex-
empting these examples from antitrust scrutiny if the Sherman Act were deemed applicable to
labor market restraints. However, manipulating this exception far from its intended field of oper-
ation merely provides an additional justification for confining the Sherman Act to regulation of
product markets.
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would call into question the legality of some agreements generally
thought to be legitimate and desirable. For these reasons, antitrust
laws should not be applied to promote competition among employers
in labor markets.'32
IV
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
FROM 1914 TO 1970
From 1914 until 1970, two Supreme Court decisions and a series
of circuit court decisions considered the scope of the Sherman Act.
Throughout this period, no one seriously suggested that the Sherman
Act applies to employer restraints in labor markets absent some show-
ing of the restraint's product market significance.
A. Anderson v. Shipowners Association of the Pacific Coast
As explained earlier, the absence of any expression of congres-
sional intent that the Sherman Act was intended to promote competi-
tion in labor markets rested in part on the perceived constitutional
inability of Congress to regulate the employer-employee relationship.
In the context of the rapid evolution of the scope of Congress' com-
merce power, the Supreme Court in 1926 decided Anderson v. Shipown-
ers Association of the Pacjfc Coast. 133
Anderson, a sailor and a member of a sailor's union, sued the
members of a shipowners association who maintained a hiring hall that
prevented him from obtaining employment. Because the shipowners
owned almost all of the merchant vessels operating out of ports on the
Pacific coast, the association was able to control the manner in which
sailors on the west coast obtained employment. Anyone seeking em-
ployment was compelled to register with an association office, receive a
number, and wait "his" turn in order to obtain employment. This re-
quirement prevented well qualified and well-known sailors from gain-
ing employment at once. 134 The association also fixed the wages. 35
Anderson contended that he sought employment but was refused
because he could not comply with one of the association's rules. He
132. Cf. Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The Emasculation
of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 459 (1981). After analyzing the application of anti-
trust laws to labor union activities, the authors conclude that the "preferable state of affairs, and
the one intended, we believe, by the authors of our national labor policy, is to confine the regula-
tion of labor conduct to the labor laws and the NLRB .... [Tihere is no legitimate purpose to
be served by distorting our nation's labor policy by the intrusion of the alien influences of anti-
trust." Id, at 514-15.
133. 272 U.S. 359 (1926).
134. Id at 361-62.
135. Id at 362.
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charged the shipowners with forming an unlawful combination in vio-
lation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The only issue on appeal was
whether his complaint stated a claim,136 and the Court held that it
did. 13
7
It is beyond question that the restraint challenged inAnderson had
potent effects in the labor market. However, since the case arose in a
period when beliefs about the scope of Congress' commerce power
were changing, the Court was preoccupied with deciding whether the
restraint was "in commerce." The association argued, consistent with a
number of precedents available to it, 138 that the employer-employee re-
lationship was intrastate in character, and hence beyond the reach of
the Sherman Act.' 39  The Court's opinion confronted this question
squarely:
If the restraint thus imposed [by the shipowners and operators] had
related to the carriage of goods in intrastate and foreign commerce-
that is to say, if each shipowner had precluded himself from making
any contract of transportation directly with the shipper and had put
himself under an obligation to refuse to carry for any person without
previous approval of the associations--the unlawful restraint would be
clear. But ships and those who operate them are instrumentalities of
commerce and within the Commerce Clause no less than cargoes.' 4°
The Court rejected the association's argument in specific terms:
It is not important, therefore, to inquire whether, as contended by re-
spondents, the object of the combination was merely to regulate the
employment of men and not to restrain commerce. A restraint of inter-
state commerce cannot be justified by the fact that the object of the
participants in the combination was to benefit themselves in a way
which might have been unobjectionable in the absence of such
restraint. 14
In essence, the court explained that regulating the employment rela-
tionship was not beyond Congress' commerce power because the asso-
136. Id at 360, 362.
137. One fact not made clear by the opinion inAnderson is whether the hiring hall was insti-
tuted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between Anderson's union and the shipown-
ers association. If there was such an agreement, the hiring hall, as a legitimate subject of
bargaining, would lose its character as an employer-imposed restraint. Also, when workers com-
bine or when labor "combines" via collective bargaining with employers in restraining the labor
market to improve working conditions, the combination and the concomitant restraint are pro-
tected by § 6 of the Clayton Act. See supra note I and accompanying text.
138. Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S. 64, 82 (1925); United
Leather Workers v. Herbert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924); United Mine Workers
v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 407-08 (1922); Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251, 272
(1918); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 178 (1908); United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1,
12 (1895).
139. Brief for Respondent at 18-22, Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n of the Pac. Coast, 272 U.S.
363 (1926).
140. Id at 362-63.
141. Id at 363.
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ciation's restraint of the employment relationship had a direct effect
upon commerce, i.e. the product market.
This point was reiterated when the Court distinguished the associ-
ation's authorities:
Here, however, the combination and the acts complained of did not
spend their intended and direct force upon a local situation. On the
contrary, they related to the employment of [1] seamen for service on
[2] ships, both of them instrumentalities of, and intended to be used in,
interstate andforeign commerce; and the immediate force of the combi-
nation, both in purpose and execution, was directed toward affecting
such commerce. The interference with commerce, therefore, was direct
and primary, and not, as in the cases cited, incidental, indirect and
secondary. 142
According to the Court, "seamen" and "ships" were both instrumental-
ities of commerce, and the labor market restraint was "directed toward
affecting," inter alia, the commercial activities of ships. Thus, the em-
ployers' labor market restraint ultimately had a product market effect,
namely, impeding the commercial activities of ships. Presumably, this
"direct and primary" effect in the product market permitted the use of
the Sherman Act to attack the employers' labor market restraint. The
link between the labor market restraint and the product market effect
was attenuated, but this attenuation was irrelevant since the only issue
was whether the complaint stated a claim.
One commentator has claimed that "[njothing in the facts of An-
derson as stated by the Court indicates any effect on competition in the
shipping industry along the Pacific Coast."' 143 This conclusion ignores
the apparent meaning of the words "both" and "such commerce" in the
quoted passage. Once it is understood that the central issue in Ander-
son was the scope of Congress' commerce power, these words assume
special significance and the case itself loses most of its value as author-
ity for the reach of the Sherman Act. Indeed, a contemporary analyst
of Anderson explained the case this way: "the court . . . refused to
allow an entrepreneur association to control 'any instrumentality of
commerce,' whether material equipment or labor supply, to the detri-
ment of interstate trade or commerce.' ' 44
In fairness to all who have tried to understand Anderson, it should
be noted that Anderson is a perplexing decision. It was decided in the
face of precedent holding that the employer-employee relationship was
142. Id at 364 (emphasis added).
143. Altman, supra note 22, at 139 n.74. Altman uses Anderson to support a reading of Apex
Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940) different from that urged in this article. See infra notes
169-92 and accompanying text.
144. Note, Monopolies-Restraint of Trade-Combination to Control Supply of Labor, 36
YALE L.J. 578, 579 (1927).
19841
208 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS L4W JOURNAL [Vol. 6:173
beyond Congress' commerce power. 145  Even viewed in the context of
those holdings, the result and reasoning of Anderson are strained.
14 6
Since the Court was preoccupied with trying to extend Congress' com-
merce power without appearing inconsistent with its prior decisions, it
is understandable that the Court failed to consider adequately the anti-
trust implications of the case. This may be why Anderson, when
viewed as an antitrust case, seems such an aberration.
147
Fortunately, fifteen years later, the Court used a dispute between
an employer and a labor union to clarify its understanding of the scope
of the Sherman Act.
B. Apex Hosiery v. Leader
In Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 41 the Court's first modern labor-anti-
trust decision, the Court explained that the Sherman Act is concerned
with product market restraints, not labor market restraints.
1 49
In an attempt to organize the employees of a hosiery factory,
union workers forcibly took possession of the employer's plant and
held a violent, protracted, sit-down strike. They destroyed machinery
and deliberately blocked the employer's out-of-state shipments.150 The
employer claimed that the union's activities violated the Sherman Act,
145. See supra cases cited in note 138.
146. Id at 578, 579 (observing inconsistency of Anderson with earlier Supreme Court prece-
dent, and offering three possible explanations of the "different conclusion" in the case).
147. One court has also suggested that the precedential value of Anderson has been eroded
because subsequent decisions have upheld the validity of hiring halls. Robertson v. National
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 882 n.24 (1975).
148. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
149. In an article discussing the applications of antitrust law to labor unions, Professor St.
Antoine comments upon Apex Hosiery. St. Antoine, Connell, Antitrust Law at the Expense of
Labor Law, 62 VA. L. REv. 603 (1976). He states:
The Apex Hosiery approach was not a matter of a statutory union exemption; the Sher-
man Act, as written, would simply not apply to a certain class of restraints. Employers,
or employees in combinations with unions, would presumably be as free as unions acting
alone to halt competition grounded in wage differentials. In short, the Sherman Act would
be confined to restraints on the product market, and the labor market would be beyond
its ken.
Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
In a later article, Professor Leslie relies upon Apex Hosiery to articulate a framework for
distinguishing lawful from unlawful union activity under the Sherman Act. Leslie, supra note 1.
He argues that it is possible for unions to violate the antitrust laws if they do what firms do when
firms violate the antitrust laws-fix prices, control outputs, or allocate customers. On the other
hand, when unions seek to monopolize the labor supply and to standardize wages and working
conditions, objectives that are legitimate under national labor policy as expressed in the Wagner
Act, they are insulated from liability even though these labor market restraints affect prices and
outputs. Thus, "unions are immunized from antitrust liability when they restrain the labor mar-
ket, but they are subject to antitrust liability when they join with firms to restrain the commercial
market." Id at 1196-97. Leslie's point is consistent with the first thesis of this article; the Sher-
man Act is not concerned with labor market competition.
150. 310 U.S. at 481-83.
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and a jury trial resulted in a verdict for the employer.' 5' On appeal, the
only question was whether the union's activities constituted a restraint
of trade or commerce condemned by the Sherman Act.' 52
The union argued that Congress intended to completely exclude
labor organizations and their activities from the operation of the Sher-
man Act.'5 3 This argument urged the Court to adopt a needlessly
broad principle. The Court had previously recognized that unions
were capable of using their power in an unlawful manner to restrain
product markets, 5 4 and a declaration that unions were not subject to
the Sherman Act might legalize all such activities. Hence, the Court
rejected the union's request for a blanket exclusion from the Act, but
the Court justified this result by approving of its earlier decisions that
the Act did apply to labor organizations. 55 This reasoning was curi-
ous, given the unabashed criticism of the Court's decisions in the legis-
lative history of section 6 of the Clayton Act. Oddly enough, the Court
managed to view the enactment of section 6 of the Clayton Act as sup-
port for its earlier decisions: because Congress purported to exempt
labor from the Sherman Act by adopting section 6, it must have agreed
that the Sherman Act did apply to labor organizations, and since the
section 6 exemption was not a total one, the unions "to some extent not
defined remain[ed] subject to [the Sherman Act]."' 156
By employing this logic to reject the union's request for a total
exclusion from the Sherman Act's coverage, the Court was left with the
task of explaining to what extent unions were subject to the Act. To
answer this question, the Court examined "three circumstances relating
to the history and application of the Act which are of striking signifi-
cance."' 57 First, the Court explained that the drafters of the Sherman
Act intended the statute to apply to product market restrictions, not to
labor market restrictions:
[The Sherman Act] was enacted in the era of "trusts" and of "combina-
tions" of businesses and of capital organized and directed to control of
151. Id at 480-81.
152. Id at 483.
153. Id at 487.
154. Id at 505-06 (discussing Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). Bedford Cut Stone Co.
v. Journeymen Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254
U.S. 443 (1921).
155. 310 U.S. at 487.
156. The Court reasoned that its holding in Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. at 274, that the Sher-
man Act applies to labor organizations, must have been a correct reading of congressional intent,
since Congress had not passed an act excluding labor organizations from the Act in thirty-two
years. 310 U.S. at 487. Citing § 6 of the Clayton Act, the Court stated: "Congress has repeatedly
enacted laws restricting or purporting to curtail the application of the Act to labor organizations
and their activities, thus recognizing that to some extent not defined they remain subject to it." Id
at 488.
157. Id at 490.
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the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods
and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter
of public concern. The end sought was the prevention of restraints to
free competition in business and commercial transactions which tended
to restrict production, raise prices or otherwise control the market to the
detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of
which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury.' 58
Second, the Court said that the Sherman Act had never been applied in
the absence of an effect in the product market:
[TIhis Court has never applied the Sherman Act in any case, whether or
not involving labor organizations or activities, unless the Court was of
the opinion that there was some form of restraint upon commercial
competition in the marketing of goods or services ... .59
Third, the Court said the Sherman Act had never been applied against
labor unions where the effect of labor's conduct in the product market
was not "substantial." Specifically, the Court explained that it had:
refused to apply the Sherman Act in cases like the present in which
local strikes conducted by illegal means in a production industry pre-
vented interstate shipment of substantial amounts of the product but in
which it was not shown that the restrictions on shipments had operated
to restrain commercial competition in some substantial way.' 60
Thus, the Court reasoned that the activities of labor unions are subject
to scrutiny under the Sherman Act only when they have substantial
effects upon "commercial competition in the marketing of goods and
services." Essential to this conclusion was the Court's identification of
the Sherman Act's purpose as promoting product market, not labor
market, competition. 61
Because of the cause-effect relationship between events in labor
markets and conditions in product markets, the Apex Hosiery Court,
having reasoned that labor union activities which have a "substantial
effect" upon competition in the product market are subject to Sherman
Act scrutiny, had to articulate some additional limiting principle on the
vulnerability of labor organization to Sherman Act claims. This articu-
lation was required by the fact that all successful union activity,
158. Id at 492-93.
159. Id at 495.
160. Id at 495-97. There is language in.Apex Hosiery that could be read to mean that em-
ployer practices directed against labor do not violate the Sherman Act:
Since the enactment of. . . § 6 of the Clayton Act . . . it would seem plain that re-
straints on the sale of an employee's services to the employer, however much they curtail
the competition among employees, are not in themselves combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade or commerce under the Sherman Act.
Id at 502-03. Because this passage is in the context of a discussion of employee combinations, it
should be assumed that these comments are limited to employee restraints, and do not apply to
multi-employer restraints. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 617 (8th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
161. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 502-03.
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whether a strike intended to persuade the employer to yield to higher
wage demands or the successful negotiation of a wage package, has
some effect, and often a substantial effect, on price competition. A
work stoppage impairs to some extent the ability of an employer to
compete in the product market; a wage agreement has some influence
on price competition insofar as it eliminates "that part of the competi-
tion which is based on differences in [wage] standards." '162
Ironically, the Court found the additional limiting principle in sec-
tion 6 of the Clayton Act, which had earlier been cited as authority for
applying the Sherman Act to labor unions. The Court said that section
6 explicitly protected anticompetitive activity of labor unions in labor
markets:
Since the enactment of [section 6 of the Clayton Act], it would seem
plain that restraints on the sale of the employee's services to the em-
ployer, however much they curtail the competition among employees,
are not in themselves combination or conspiracies in restraint of trade
or commerce under the Sherman Act. 16 3
The Court acknowledged that the activities of labor unions affect the
ability of employers "to compete in the market with those not subject to
such demands" from labor, but concluded that "this effect on competi-
tion has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of price com-
petition prohibited by the Sherman Act."' 6
In the factual setting of Apex Hosiery, the Court was unable to
find that the union had restrained competition in the product market in
any way:
This is not a case of a labor organization being used by combinations of
those engaged in an industry as the means or instrument for sup-
pressing competition or fixing prices .... Here it is plain that the
combination or conspiracy did not have as its purpose restraint upon
competition in the market for [Apex Hosiery's] product. 165
The purpose of the concerted employee activity was to force the em-
ployer to accede to the union's demands. A natural consequence of the
combination was to interfere with the interstate shipment of Apex Ho-
siery's goods, but it appeared that "the delay of these shipments was
not intended to have and had no effect on prices" in Apex Hosiery's
product market.' 66
Thus, Apex Hosiery articulated two principles. First, the Sherman
Act applies to concerted activity that has the purpose or effect of re-
straining the product market. As a result, federal antitrust laws are
162. Id at 503.
163. Id at 502-03.
164. Id at 503-04.
165. Id at 501.
166. Id
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concerned with concerted activity in the labor market only insofar as
that activity has the purpose or effect of restraining competition in the
product market. Second, unions are protected from antitrust liability
under section 6 of the Clayton Act when they restrain the labor market
for the purpose of promoting legitimate labor objectives, such as im-
proving wages or working conditions. These activities are insulated
even though they have indirect effects in the product market; however,
unions have no protection from antitrust liability when they attempt to
restrain the product market directly.
Apex Hosiery is most often remembered for providing a frame-
work for analysis of the legality of union activities under the Sherman
Act. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have also considered to
what extent unions are subject to the antitrust laws, and what is left of
Apex Hosiery with regard to the antitrust liability of unions has been
explored elsewhere.' 67  But Apex Hosiery also provides a framework
for analysis of the legality of concerted employer activities in labor
markets, for the Court accepted the proposition that labor market re-
straints are not within the ambit of the Sherman Act unless there is
some relationship to market control of the commodity:
[T]he Sherman Act was not enacted. . . to afford a remedy for wrongs,
which ... result from combinations and conspiracies which fall short,
both in their purpose and effect, of any form of market control of a
commodity, such as to "monopolize the supply, control its price, or dis-
criminate between its would-be purchasers."'
168
One commentator recently offered a different reading of Apex Ho-
siery. 169 Altman first described the "view" of one district court 70 and
some commentators 17 as follows:
Stone's use of the term "commercial competition" in Apex refers to the
competitive structure of a product market only, not a labor market. In
that view, Stone modified "competition" with the term "commercial" in
order to refer only to transactions regarding goods and services be-
tween entrepreneurs.' 7
2
Altman misreads the manner in which the one district court 73 and the
167. See Leslie, supra note 1.
168. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 512.
169. Altman, supra note 22.
170. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Wool Workers v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp. 482
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
171. Cox, Labor and the Antitrust Laws-A Preliminary Analysis, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252, 254-
55 (1954); Handler, Labor andAntitrust." .4 Bit oHistory, 40 ANTITRUST L.J. 233, 235 (1971); St.
Antoine, supra note 142, at 606.
172. Altman, supra note 22, at 138.
173. Many other courts share the view of the "one district court." See infra notes 262-308 and
accompanying text.
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commentators understand Apex Hosiery.'74 Stone said that "commer-
cial competition" means competition "in the marketing of goods and
services", that is, competition in the market where goods and services
are sold, which is denominated in this article as the "product market."
Hence, Stone referred to more than "transactions regarding goods and
services between entrepreneurs." Any combination that restrainsprod-
uct market competition -whether an exchange of information, an
agreement on the price to be charged, or an agreement to blacklist an
employee-is subject to Sherman Act scrutiny unless specifically
exempted.
Altman offered an "alternative interpretation" of what Stone said:
Stone "could have used 'commercial competition' to distinguish be-
tween conduct that does or does not affect the competitive structure of
a product market."' 75 This "alternative interpretation" is actually con-
sistent with the way we read, and probably the way the "one district
court" and the identified commentators read Stone: multi-employer
conduct that is anticompetitive in the product market is unlawful, but
multi-employer conduct that is anticompetitive solely in the labor mar-
ket is not unlawful.
Altman, however, concluded under his alternative interpretation
that "commercial competition" must include labor market competi-
tion. "'76 This conclusion is erroneous: it does not follow from Altman's
"interpretation" that the Sherman Act must apply to anticompetitive
conduct in labor markets. It is consistent with Stone's use of "commer-
cial competition" to say that the Sherman Act is concerned with multi-
employer conduct in labor markets f that conduct has an anticompeti-
tive effect in a product market. Competitive conditions in labor mar-
kets, viewed apart from their relationship to conditions in the product
market, are irrelevant so far as the Sherman Act is concerned.
Altman offered three reasons to support his contention that Apex
Hosiery stands for the proposition that the Sherman Act applies to
multi-employer conduct restraining competition in labor markets, even
in the absence of an adverse effect on product market competition. Alt-
man argued first that, unless Stone intended the Sherman Act to apply
to labor market restraints, Stone's discussion of the product market-
labor market distinction would have been obiter dicta and otherwise
inapt.'77 This is incorrect: Stone's discussion was necessary because,
under his framework, multi-employer restraints in labor markets are
subject to the antitrust laws f those restraints have unlawful anticom-
174. It is impossible to know exactly what the "view" of these commentators was since none
of them discussed employer restraints in the labor market.
175. Altman, supra note 22, at 138.
176. Id at 138-40.
177. Id at 138-39.
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petitive effects in a product market. Consequently, it was perfectly ap-
propriate for Stone to discuss the distinctions between the two markets.
Next, Altman contends that if Stone believed the Sherman Act to
be concerned only with product market competition, his failure to dis-
cuss and either to distinguish or to overrule Anderson would have been
a glaring omission.178 As noted earlier, Anderson does not necessarily
stand for the proposition that the Sherman Act applies to anticompeti-
tive conduct in labor markets.' 79 Because Anderson was principally a
commerce clause case, not an antitrust case, Stone's failure to discuss it
is not troubling. Indeed, Anderson was not cited in any of the briefs
submitted inApex Hosiery, as were the other cases discussed by Stone.
Since Anderson was so confused, and since arguably it resolved a differ-
ent issue, Stone may have deliberately chosen to overlook it, assuming
he was even aware of it.' 80
Finally, Altman argues that Stone would not have relied on com-
mon law restraint of trade cases to determine what section 1 means if
he did not intend the Sherman Act to apply to labor market re-
straints.' 81 Altman notes that one unlawful restraint of trade around
1890 was a contract in which an employee promised not to seek similar
employment for what courts deemed an unreasonable period of time
following termination of current employment. 182 This point must be
qualified by several considerations. First, Stone specifically described
the common law doctrines on contracts and combinations in restraint
of trade as involving "contracts for the restriction or suppression of
competition in the market, agreements to fix prices, divide marketing
territories, apportion customers, restrict production and the like prac-
tices, which tend to raise prices or otherwise take from buyers or con-
sumers the advantages which accrue to them from free competition in
the market."' 83 These common law doctrines were the ones Stone be-
lieved the Sherman Act was intended to implement, and all of them
involve product market competition. In addition, covenants not to seek
employment with someone else after terminating employment are but
one type of a covenant not to compete. Other such covenants are
designed to prevent employees from starting their own businesses in
competition with their former employers in the same product markets.
Also, most covenants preventing employees from working for another
employer are designed to preserve the present employer's competitive
posture in the product market. Indeed, that is why courts insist that the
178. Id at 139.
179. See supra notes 143-57 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
181. Altman, supra note 15, at 139-40.
182. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 497.
183. Id
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covenants be geographically and temporally restricted: broader cove-
nants are unnecessary to protect the employer's business. The em-
ployee who leaves to work for another employer has the potential to
divert customers, reveal secrets about production methods, and give
other assistance to the new employer which damages the business of the
preceding one. Thus, such covenants, even though they affect the labor
market, also have significant product market consequences. Finally,
although the Sherman Act debates frequently suggest that the purpose
of the Act was to codify existing English and American common law
on restraints of trade, it has been documented elsewhere that the draft-
ers had no real understanding of the common law prohibitions on re-
straints of trade. 84 Therefore, any effort to use the common law
concerning "restraint of trade" to establish the scope of the Sherman
Act is of dubious value.
Finally, Altman argues that "[ejven if Stone had intended to re-
strict the Act's application to conduct affecting the competitive struc-
ture of a product market, subsequent antitrust cases would have
undermined that restriction."' 85 A number of cases to which Altman
refers are simply decided incorrectly, many erroneously following the
holding in Cordova v. Bache & Co. ,86 which is critically analyzed later
in this Article. 187 Altman also refers to United States v. NationalAssoci-
ation of Real Estate Boards,'88 in which the Court adopted a definition
of "trade" under the Sherman Act that includes the labor of an em-
ployee.' 89 Still, it is not true, as Altman argues, that "[t]his holding can
be reconciled with Apex only by adopting the view that 'commercial
competition' includes competition in a labor market, because an em-
ployee's sale of labor is 'trade or commerce.' ""9 The defendants in
National Association of Real Estate Brokers were real estate brokers
charged with fixing commission rates they charged the public. Brokers
are independent contractors, who are subject to the antitrust laws be-
cause, in providing a service to the public, they are engaged in business
in product markets.' 9 ' Indeed, the Court specifically stated that "we
think it a misconception to assimilate the services involved here to
those of employees or to compare the present case to those involving
the application of the antitrust laws to labor unions."' 92 Therefore, the
Court's discussion of the meaning of "trade" must be read in the light
184. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
185. Altman, supra note 22, at 140.
186. 321 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
187. See infra notes 221-51 and accompanying text.
188. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
189. Altman, supra note 22, at 140.
190. Id
191. See infra notes 317-20 and accompanying text.
192. NationalAss'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. at 489-90.
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of the specific situation presented to the Court, which involved a prod-
uct market restraint and not a restraint on the labor market where em-
ployees sell their services to employers.
To summarize, the question of whether the Sherman Act was con-
cerned with labor market competition was not answered definitively for
a half-century after the Act's enactment. Under the principles articu-
lated inApex Hosiery, employer restraints in labor markets are not ille-
gal simply because of anticompetitive purposes or effects in labor
markets. Employer restraints in labor markets are subject to antitrust
scrutiny only if they have an effect upon or the purpose to affect com-
petition in a product market.
C Apex Hosiery to 1970
In the thirty years following Apex Hosiery, no one seriously sug-
gested that the Sherman Act was intended to promote competition in
the labor market. Professor Cox, in his influential article on antitrust
and labor law, stated: "[t]he only demonstrable purpose of the Sher-
man Act was to protect consumers against rising prices, limitations on
production or the deterioration of quality, by forcing businessmen to
compete with one another."' 93 He concluded "that the antitrust laws
are not concerned with competition among laborers or with bargains
over the price or supply of labor-its compensation or hours of services
or the selection and tenure of employees."' 94 Professor Cox's article
did not specifically address multi-employer activity in labor markets,
but his conclusion accurately described the contours of the law in the
period following Apex Hosiery. In each of the four federal Circuit
Courts of Appeal that considered the question of employer restraints in
labor markets after Apex Hosiery and before 1970, the courts, with va-
rying degrees of clarity, insisted upon some evidence that the chal-
lenged restraint was intended to affect or actually had an effect in a
product market.
The first of these cases was the Ninth Circuit's decision in 1950 in
Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees. 19 5
Members of a carpenters union claimed, inter alia, that their employers,
a number of major motion picture studios, compelled smaller studios to
employ allegedly less efficient members of a rival union. Plaintiffs
claimed that this would increase the production costs of the smaller
studios and cause them to go out of business, thereby enabling the ma-
jor studios to increase the prices of their products.
The court said that "these alleged acts do not constitute a violation
193. Cox, supra note 171, at 256.
194. Id at 254-55.
195. 183 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950).
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of the anti-trust laws."' 196 Relying on Apex Hosiery, the court ex-
plained that "[c]ompeling others to adopt certain employment policies
is not a restraint upon commercial competition."' 97 The court held that
plaintiffs' loss of "their rights of employment is not a result of any les-
sening of commercial competition among the studios."' 198 The claim
that plaintiffs would be damaged by higher prices for tickets to movies
did state a product market effect within the reach of the Sherman Act,
but the "alleged possibility" that plaintiffs would have to pay higher
ticket prices was "far too remote and speculative to be the basis of any
recovery of damages."' 99 Thus, the court in this early decision viewed
the complaint as essentially stating a restraint on labor market competi-
tion only, a claim with which the Sherman Act is not concerned.
A few years later, the Second Circuit cited product market conse-
quences when refusing to dismiss a complaint challenging a labor mar-
ket restraint. In Union Circulation Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,"
the Commission charged agencies in the business of selling magazine
subscriptions door-to-door with engaging in unfair trade practices in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2 °  The
agencies conducted their business by contracting with solicitors, who
collected subscription proceeds and were paid on a commission ba-
sis.202 The agencies entered into agreements, typically providing that
no agency would retain any solicitors who had been employed by the
other signatory agencies at any time during a certain period, usually
the preceding year. The Commission found that the no-switching
agreements unreasonably restrained trade and constituted unfair meth-
ods of competition under section 5 .20
On appeal, the court applied the test for validity of a restraint of
trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act to determine whether section
5 had been violated 2' and affirmed the Commission's findings.2 0 5 The
court acknowledged that the restraint at issue was a labor market re-
straint in that the "no-switching" agreements are directed at the regula-
tion of hiring practices and the supervision of employee conduct, 20 6 but
the court said that the validity of the restraints "must be considered in




200. 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
201. Id at 654.
202. Id
203. Id at 655.
204. Id at 656.
205. Id at 658.
206. Id at 657. In this regard, the court referred to Anderson v. Shipowners' Ass'n of Pac.
Coast, 272 U.S. 359 (1926), but the court evidently placed no reliance on Anderson, because it did
not state whether the restraint therein would be invalid per se or whether it was to be tested
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the light of their impact upon the competitive structure of the industry
affected. ' 2" The court concluded that "the reasonably foreseeable ef-
fect" of the labor market restraint "will be to impair or diminish com-
petition between existing subscription agencies, and to prevent would-
be competitors from engaging in similar activity. '"208 The court added
that one effect of the restraint would "be to 'freeze' the labor supply"
and "to discourage labor mobility," and that the consequence of this
effect would be to cause "the magazine-selling industry [to] become
static in its composition to the obvious advantage of the large, well-
established signatory agencies and to the disadvantage of infant
organizations. ' 09
Thus, the court in Union Circulation discussed the significant an-
ticompetitive effects of the multi-employer restraint in the labor mar-
ket, but the court also identified the secondary effect of the labor
market restraint in the product market. While the court's decision was
not entirely clear on this point, it seemed to find the multi-employer
agreement to be harmful to competition; it therefore determined the
agreement to be an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act because of the ultimate product market consequences
of this restraint in the labor market.
Whatever uncertainty existed on this question in the Second Cir-
cuit after Union Circulation was resolved six years later by the Circuit's
decision in Kennedy v. Long Island Rail Road. 10 A railroad workers
union alleged that various railroads had violated the Sherman Act by
participating in a strike insurance plan. The court rejected this allega-
tion for the "fundamental reason" that the Sherman Act was "designed
principally to outlaw restraints upon commercial competition in the
marketing and pricing of goods and services" and was not intended as
an "instrument . . . for the regulation of labor-management rela-
tions."2'' The union specifically argued that "the price of labor is arti-
ficially manipulated whenever a railroad is permitted to avail itself of
the proceeds of strike insurance, '2 12 but the court dismissed this argu-
ment, stating that the "answer lies in the clear language" of the first
sentence of section 6 of the Clayton Act. 13
Four years after the Second Circuit's decision in Long Island Rail
Road, the Seventh Circuit considered the validity of a no-switching
"under the particular circumstances of the industry," meaning, presumably, for its effect in the
product market. 241 F.2d at 657 n.2. See supra text accompanying notes 133-47.
207. 241 F.2d at 656.
208. Id at 658.
209. Id
210. 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963).
211. Id. at 372-73.
212. Id at 373.
213. Id
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agreement under the antitrust laws in Nichols v. Spencer International
Press, Inc. 214 In Nichols, the plaintiff, an encyclopedia salesman, al-
leged that manufacturers of encyclopedias had violated the Sherman
Act to his detriment by agreeing not to hire a salesman who had within
six months worked for another. The defendants claimed that the chal-
lenged activity could not, as a matter of law, violate the Sherman Act
because, pursuant to the first sentence of section 6, any "agreement re-
straining freedom with respect to employment of labor is not, as such, a
violation of the antitrust laws. ' 2 5  However, the court held that the
allegations would state a claim under the Sherman Act if the alleged
agreement had a substantial effect "upon the business of supplying en-
cyclopedias and reference books. 21 6 In support of this conclusion, the
court stated:
Granting that the antitrust laws were not enacted for the purpose of
preserving freedom in the labor market, nor of regulating employment
practices as such, nevertheless it seems clear that agreements among
supposed competitors not to employ each other's employees not only
restrict freedom to enter into employment relationships, but may also,
depending upon the circumstances, impair full and free competition in
the supply of a service or commodity to the public.217
The court reversed a summary judgment in favor of defendants on the
antitrust issues, stating "[w]e cannot say, as a matter of law, that the
effect of the 'no-switching' agreement. . . upon the business of supply-
ing encyclopedias and reference books is so negligible that the agree-
ment is not a restraint of trade in such products. '218
Finally, in 1970, the Fifth Circuit in Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America,219 affirmed the dismissal
of a union's claim that an alleged conspiracy between two companies
not to deal with the union over wage rates and working conditions con-
stituted a claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court, rely-
214. 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
215. Id at 335.
216. Id at 337.
217. Id at 335-336. However, a more recent Seventh Circuit opinion could be read as signal-
ing a retreat from the analysis in Nichols. In In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d
514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983), the court considered whether plaintiff had
suffered an antitrust injury that conferred standing. The court described the facts in Nichols as a
conspiracy "intended to restrict competitive conditions in the labor market" and stated that the
"injuries complained of, restriction of employment alternatives, were directly related to the an-
ticompetitive restraints." Id at 517. The court held plaintiffhad no antitrust injury because "[h]is
injury did not result from a lack of competition in the labor market." Id However, whether a
claim exists is conceptually distinct from the question of standing. See infra note 341 and accom-
panying text. Hence, Industrial Gas should not be interpreted to mean that a plaintiff who pleads
damage from a labor market restraint, without pleading that the labor market restraint had an
anticompetitive effect in the product market, states a claim under the Sherman Act.
218. 371 F.2d at 337.
219. 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
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ing upon Apex Hosiery, stated that, because the union failed to allege
"a conspiracy or combination on the part of Prepmore and Blue Bell to
restrain competition in the marketing of Prepmore's goods," its allega-
tions did "not rise to the level of alleging a restraint of the type to
which the Sherman Act is directed. 2 0
Thus, prior to the end of 1970,u11 three circuit courts had held and
one other had suggested, consistently with Apex Hosiery, that the Sher-
man Act does not apply to labor market restraints absent some showing
of anticompetitive product market effects.
V
RECENT CASES: Two DISTINCT APPROACHES
Notwithstanding the substantial authority that the Sherman Act is
not concerned with promoting competition in labor markets, Judge
Mansfield's decision in Cordova v. Bache & Co. 222 held that the Sher-
man Act applies to multi-employer restraints in labor markets. A
number of recent cases follow Cordova while other cases follow the
analytical framework outlined in Apex Hosiery. Thus, the recent cases
contain two distinct approaches to the question of whether employer
restraints in labor markets that lack either a purpose to restrain or an
actual anticompetitive effect in product markets are illegal under the
Sherman Act.
A. Cordova v. Bache & Co.
In Cordova, unorganized employees of stock exchange brokerage
firms sued their employers under section 1 of the Sherman Act for al-
legedly conspiring to reduce the commissions paid to such employees.
The effect of this claimed agreement allegedly had "been to reduce
competition in the hiring of representatives and in the compensation
paid to them. ' 223 The defendants moved to dismiss the antitrust
claims.
Under existing precedents, including two cases in the Second Cir-
cuit,224 the complaint could have been attacked for its failure to allege
an effect in, or an intent to affect, the product market. However, Judge
Mansfield considered only the issue of whether "monolithic action of
brokerage firms in uniformly reducing the commissions paid to their
representatives is exempt from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws"
220. Id at 1007.
221. Prepmore was decided on August 3, 1970. Cordova v. Bache & Co., 321 F. Supp. 600
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), was decided on December 9, 1970.
222. Id
223. Id at 603.
224. Kennedy v. Long Island R.R., 319 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1963); Union Circulation Co. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957).
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under section 6 of the Clayton Act.22 5 After reviewing the history of
section 6, Judge Mansfield concluded that the only concerted employer
conduct exempted by section 6 is conduct related to multi-employer
collective bargaining, and that
no authority supports the proposition that a group of employers may
jointly agree upon the wages to be paid to their respective employees in
the absence of an anticipated multi-employer agreement with a labor
organization representing the employees.226
This description of the scope of the Sherman Act is too broad. By
focusing exclusively upon activity exempted from Sherman Act cover-
age, Judge Mansfield failed to even consider what types of concerted
activities are covered by the Sherman Act. In fact, Judge Mansfield
seems to have assumed that any concerted activity not exempted by
section 6 of the Clayton Act is actionable under the Sherman Act.
However, in the words of Apex Hosiery, concerted activities "not im-
munized by the Clayton Act are not necessarily violations of the Sher-
man Act." '2 2 7 In particular, concerted activities not affecting
competition in the market for goods and services are not within the
scope of the Sherman Act even if not exempted by section 6 of the
Clayton Act.228  For example, in Amalgamated Clothing & Textile
Workers v. JP. Stevens & Co. ,229 the court agreed that an alleged
wage-fixing conspiracy was not exempt under section 6.230 Neverthe-
less, the court dismissed the complaint, finding an absence of "monop-
olistic effect upon competition in the marketplace for goods or
services."
231
In addition to incorrectly assuming that concerted activity affect-
ing only the market for labor is illegal under the Sherman Act unless
exempt, Judge Mansfield misinterpreted the first sentence of section 6
of the Clayton Act. Judge Mansfield agreed that the first sentence of
section 6-"the labor of a human being is not an article of com-
merce"-supports the conclusion that concerted activities affecting
only the labor market are not covered by the Sherman Act.2 32 That
225. 321 F. Supp. at 608.
226. Id
227. Apex Hosiery, 310 U.S. at 512. The Supreme Court has often referred to the "heavy
presumption against implicit exemptions" from the Sherman Act. See, e.g., United States v. Phil-
adelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51, 370 (1963). However, the question of whether the
Sherman Act applies to labor markets is not one of "implicit exemptions"; rather, the question is
whether the Sherman Act is concerned with competition in labor markets at all.
228. See Berman Enterprises Inc. v. Local 333, Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,852 at 78,516 (2d Cir.
1981) (union-employer agreements on nonmandatory subjects of bargaining illegal only "if they
constitute restraints on competition in a business market").
229. 475 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1980).
230. Id at 488.
231. Id at 490.
232. 321 F. Supp. at 605 ("If the language of § 6 of the Clayton Act stopped with the sentence
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interpretation, virtually compelled by the language of the first sentence,
had already been rendered by the Second Circuit before 1970.233 How-
ever, Judge Mansfield went on to conclude that the clear meaning of
that sentence was overridden by the remainder of section 6 and its his-
tory, which he interpreted as demonstrating "that the sole purpose and
effect of [section 6] is to exempt activities and agreements on the part of
labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations with respect to their
furnishing labor in the market place." '234 He elaborated as follows:
It seems clear that if Congress had wanted to exempt agreements be-
tween employers as to the money or compensation that would be paid
to their employees, it would not have limited § 6 to exemption of "[t]he
labor of a human being" which can be restrained only by the employ-
ees or unions controlling the labor itself. Congress would also have
provided that compensation offered or paid by employers to employees
is not a commodity or article of commerce. This it did not do.235
Although this analysis has been accepted without question,236 it is un-
satisfactory for a number of reasons.
First, the fact that the history of section 6 shows no concern over
exempting employer practices proves nothing. As documented earlier
in this article, no one at the time had any reason to believe employer
practices directed against labor violated the Sherman Act in the first
place. 237 The absence in the section 6 debates of any suggestion that
Congress intended to exempt employer activities affecting labor is far
less significant than the absence in the Sherman Act debates of any
demonstrated intent to prohibit such activities.
Second, by focusing on the substance of section 6 divorced from
the scope of the Sherman Act, Judge Mansfield engaged in analysis
which risks overstating the legitimate reach of the Sherman Act. It
does not follow from the conclusion that a given restraint falls outside
the scope of the section 6 exemption that the restraint lies within the
scope of section 1. Thus, if one's attention were confined to the exemp-
tion in testing an employer restraint in a labor market, one could de-
cide that the exemption does not "cover" the activity but overlook the
fact that the Sherman Act did not prohibit the restraint in the first
place. Judge Mansfield's analysis notwithstanding, if the challenged
quoted by defendants, it would lend support to their position [that a combination and conspiracy
on the part of employers with respect to the labor of their employees is exempt from the Sherman
Act].").
233. Kennedy, 319 F.2d at 366.
234. 321 F. Supp. at 605.
235. Id at 606.
236. See Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 617 n.22 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
237. See supra text accompanying notes 38-71.
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restraint does not impair product market competition, the scope of the
section 6 exemption is irrelevant.
Third, Judge Mansfield's conclusion that exempting labor organi-
zations from the reach of the Sherman Act is the only purpose properly
ascribable to section 6 overlooks significant discussion concerning both
the first and second sentences of section 6.238 In particular, it overlooks
Senator Cummins' intent, as the author of the first sentence of section
6, to exclude the sale of labor to an employer from the reach of the
Sherman Act.2 39 Moreover, Judge Mansfield's conclusion cannot be
reconciled with what the second sentence of section 6 was thought to
mean standing alone. When what became section 6 was first proposed,
it did not include the first sentence declaring that the "labor of a
human being" is not an "article of commerce." That sentence was ad-
ded at the beginning of a paragraph that already specifically exempted
activities of labor unions. 2' In a report on a draft of section 6 without
the first sentence, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary expressed its
view that section 6 meant that "labor is not, and ought not to be re-
garded as, a commodity within the purview of the antitrust laws."24 ' In
the Committee's view, this abbreviated version of section 6, limited in
that it referred only to "organizations," was still broad enough to mean
that labor matters generally are outside the scope of the antitrust laws,
which were presumably intended to apply only to commercial markets.
Judge Mansfield agreed that the first sentence of section 6, if it stood
alone, would support the view that employer restraints in labor markets
do not, in and of themselves, violate the antitrust laws.242 Yet the Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary thought the second sentence of section
6, standing alone, meant exactly what the first sentence says.
Fourth, it is at least ironic that Judge Mansfield did not apply
strictly his own view of the purpose of section 6. After reviewing the
history of section 6, Judge Mansfield concluded "that the sole purpose
238. See supra text accompanying notes 72-100.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 86-100.
240. As reported from the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, § 7 provided:
That nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the pur-
poses of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations, from lawfully carrying out the legiti-
mate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-
trust laws.
H.R. 15657 as reported by the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess., July 22, 1914,
at 7; reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 1756.
This line was not added until the last day of the Senate debates on the House bill, on Septem-
ber 2, 1914. 51 CONG. REc. 14591 (1914), reprinted in 1 E. KINTNER, supra note 38, at 2379-80.
241. S. REP. No. 698, 63rd Cong. 2d Sess., 46 (1914), reprinted in I E. KINTNER, supra note
38, at 1748.
242. 321 F. Supp. at 605.
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and effect of [section 6] is to exempt activities and agreements on the
part of labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations with respect
to their furnishing labor in the market place. 243  However, Judge
Mansfield also held that the exemption provided by section 6 extends
to "multi-employer combinations with respect to industry-wide wages
or working conditions" in the context of collective bargaining. 244
Judge Mansfield's conclusion that section 6 exempts multi-employer
agreements in connection with or in preparation for collective bargain-
ing is correct, but this is not consistent with his conclusion that the
"sole" purpose of section 6 is to exempt union activities and agree-
ments. In some situations, multi-employer activity is protected by sec-
tion 6, thus demonstrating that the purpose of section 6 is not solely to
protect activities and agreements of labor organizations. The admitted
extension of the exemption to employers in that context demonstrates
that its purpose is not limited to the protection of unions.
Finally, even if this inconsistency is overlooked on the ground that
the multi-employer agreements Judge Mansfield considers exempt are
connected with collective bargaining, an activity in which unions do
engage, Judge Mansfield's conclusion that employer agreements to de-
termine wages are legal only in the collective bargaining context still
cannot be correct. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act
245
protects all concerted activities of employees related to working condi-
tions, whether or not a union is involved. 246 Surely such concerted ac-
tivity does not violate the Sherman Act, even though it does not involve
a "labor organization." In the same vein, an employer cannot reason-
ably be held to violate the Sherman Act when it responds to protected
concerted behavior of its employees. 247 For example, were a group of
employees to threaten resignation unless their supervisor were removed
because the supervisor had failed to recommend wage increases, their
activities would be protected. If the employer responded to that de-
mand by firing the supervisor, that surely would not give the supervisor
243. Id (emphasis added).
244. Id at 607.
245. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
246. Eg., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). Also, § 8(d) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. IV 1980), defines collective bargaining as discussions between
"the employer and the representative of the employees." The term "labor organization" is not
used. "Representatives" is defined in § 2(4) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(4) (Supp. IV 1980) as
including individuals or labor organizations, and "labor organizations" is defined broadly in
§ 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
247. Virtually all employer conduct toward employees is at least arguably directed toward
concerted employee behavior. This is because in all but the smallest companies the employer
must deal with employees.as a group, with full recognition that the employees will probably col-
laborate on their response.
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an antitrust claim against the employer.248 Moreover, when two non-
union contractors who are simultaneously seeking a federal contract
agree to pay their employees the prevailing wage, they may have "con-
spired" within the meaning of the antitrust laws.249 The antitrust laws
presumably do not reach these agreements, even if no union or con-
certed employee action is involved. Thus, the exemption provided by
section 6 cannot properly be limited to employee activities involving
"labor organizations." The exemption must also include all concerted
employee activity related to working conditions and concerted re-
sponses by employers to that activity.
In short, the analysis in Cordova lays a weak foundation for a far-
reaching application of the Sherman Act to labor markets. Nonethe-
less, Cordova has received unusual recognition for a district court opin-
ion,2 ° perhaps because of Judge Mansfield's elevation to the Second
Circuit in 1971. It has been approved by distinguished commenta-
tors,25' and it has been relied upon in some cases, many of which in-
volve professional sports.252
B. Cordova's Kindred
A number of other courts have decided expressly or by implication
that the Sherman Act does not apply to employer restraints in labor
markets regardless of whether the restraints have a purpose to affect or
an effect in product markets, but these cases lack Judge Mansfield's
searching analysis in the Cordova case. One of the few cases in which a
rationale is at least clearly articulated is Cesnick v. Chrysler Corp. 253
The court, in holding that "the market for employee skills is a market
subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act,"'25 4 concluded thatAnder-
248. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (Court held it is
illegalper se for a manufacturer to refuse to deal with one store at the request of other stores).
249. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 209, 226-27 (1939) (conspiracy existed
when several persons all participated in a common scheme, even though they did not deal with
each other).
250. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n
Inc., 483 F.2d 384, 393 (3d Cir. 1973) ("exhaustive opinion").
251. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 2, at 198-99. In the first volume of their
treatise, Areeda and Turner criticize Nichols and use Cordova to illustrate the "correct view" that
"trade restrictions in the labor market are subject to the same antitrust sanctions as usual when
collective bargaining is not involved." Id at 202. If Areeda and Turner mean that restraints in
labor markets that have illegal product market effects or purposes violate the Sherman Act, they
are correct. But if Areeda and Turner approve, as they seem to, of Cordova's conclusion that
restraints in labor markets per se offend the antitrust laws irrespective of any anticompetitive
product market restraint, we disagree.
252. E.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 801 (1977).
253. 490 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
254. Id at 864.
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son was controlling; however, the court neither referred to nor cited
Apex Hosiery.
The reasoning in other cases is less clear.z55 One such case is par-
ticularly interesting because Judge Mansfield sat on the panel which
decided it. Drayer v. Krasner,256 an opinion authored by Judge
Friendly, held that the New York Stock Exchange's requirement of ar-
bitration in all disputes between registered representatives and member
firms did not violate the antitrust laws. The court began by noting that
compelling member firms to include such a clause in their contracts
with registered representatives "does not inhibit the freedom of any
firm in competing for business or of any investor in seeking the firm
that will give him the best and cheapest service. '"257 Unfortunately, the
opinion then undercut the significance of this sentence by testing the
clause under the rule of reason to determine its effect in inhibiting firms
competing for the services of registered representatives; 58 the court
thus assumed that labor market restraints are subject to antitrust scru-
tiny because of their effects in labor markets.
The First Circuit rejected a similar argument advanced by an em-
ployee in Dickstein v. duPont,2 59 but the rationale underlying the
court's view of the scope of the Sherman Act is unclear. The court first
expressed its inability to understand how the arbitration requirement
"could have an anti-competitive impact in the securities market. 26°
Yet it later referred to the employee's argument that "the Stock Ex-
change rule unreasonably impairs the ability of its members to compete
with one another in the labor market" as "appellant's best antitrust ar-
gument." The court went on to reject this argument, but it did not
consider whether the Sherman Act was concerned with labor market
restraints that have no anticompetitive effect in the product market.2 6'
Cordova remains the leading case for the proposition that the
Sherman Act applies to labor market restraints, in large part because
no other case reaching the same result attempts to articulate a cogent
rationale. At the same time, other courts have refused to follow the
approach of Cordova and have instead continued to insist the plaintiff
demonstrate that the challenged restraint has an anticompetitive effect
255. For example, in Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1148
(5th Cir. 1977), the circuit court assumed that the Sherman Act applies to labor markets. In mak-
ing this assumption, the circuit court may have been confused by the closely related sports cases.
See infra notes 319-26 and accompanying text.
256. 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1978).
257. Id at 354.
258. Id at 354-59.
259. 443 F.2d 783 (lst Cir. 1971).
260. Id at 787.
261. Id at 787-88.
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in the product market or is accompanied by an intent to restrain that
market.
C Recent Decisions Following Apex Hosiery
During the last twenty years, a number of cases have reiterated the
Apex Hosiery theme that restraints are not subject to Sherman Act pro-
scriptions unless they are intended to affect or actually do unreasonably
restrain competition in a market for goods or services.262 These cases
agree that the only focus of the antitrust laws is on "direct restraints in
the business market," and that this focus reflects "the congressional
policy favoring free competition in business markets. 263
1. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc.
The foregoing principles were embraced in the Fifth Circuit's re-
cent opinion in Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth,
Inc. 2' Two unions sued two trade associations and two member con-
struction companies, claiming that the defendants had violated the
Sherman Act by agreeing among themselves and with other construc-
tion employers to hire only non-union contractors and subcontrac-
262. H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 715 n.16 (1981) (citing
Apex Hosiery, Court states that "the Sherman Act prohibits only restraints on 'commercial com-
petition,'. . . or those market restraints designed to monopolize supply, control prices, or allocate
product distribution"); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
U.S. 676, 692 (1956) (agreement between union and employer might be illegal because of "the
obvious restraint on the product market"); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 663
(1965) (agreement between union and coal producers illegal under the antitrust laws because "the
restraint on the product market is direct and immediate"); Radovich v. National Football League,
352 U.S. 445, 453-54 n.10 (1957) (quoting Apex Hosiery, conspiracy to boycott football players
from competing league with a view toward destruction of that league actionable under the anti-
trust laws because of the effect on "purchasers or consumers of goods and services"); United Brick
& Clay Workers v. Junction City Clay Co., 158 F.2d 552, 554 (6th Cir. 1946); International Ass'n
of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (W.D. Pa.
1971), vacated, 483 F.2d 384 (3rd Cir. 1973). Cf Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 278-82 (1968) (agreement involving union is possibly anticompetitive
under standards of shipping Act because of its effect on competition among employers); Amalga-
mated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau Foods, Inc., 597 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1979) (question in cases
involving labor is "whether the restraint directly or indirectly affects market prices and free com-
petition for the consuming public"); see Leslie, supra note 1, at 1184 ("the antitrust statutes pro-
hibit restraints of trade, that is, business market restraints").
263. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622
(1975). A number of other cases contain similar language. See, e.g., Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v.
Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51 (2d Cir. 1960) ("antitrust laws do not reach possibly tor-
tious activities by labor organizations which are not shown to have or to be intended to have an
effect upon competition or prices"); United Brick & Clay Workers v. Junction City Clay Co., 158
F.2d 552, 554 (6th Cir. 1946); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 511 F.
Supp. 509, 520 (E.D. La. 1981) ("The [Sherman] Act was aimed at business combinations and not
labor unions"); International Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, Inc.,
331 F. Supp. 1298, 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Kolb v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 141 F. Supp. 264, 266
(N.D. Cal. 1956).
264. 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3342 (1983).
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tors.26 5 The unions contended that this agreement undermined existing
collective bargaining agreements between the unions and other con-
struction employers, reduced wages and fringe benefits, and resulted in
less favorable work opportunities and working conditions. These
claims, at least facially, alleged only that the defendants had restrained
the labor market. The district court doubted whether these alleged acts
of the defendants were within the scope of the Sherman Act, but the
trial court dismissed the claims on the ground that the defendants' con-
duct was protected by the nonstatutory exemption to the antitrust laws
articulated by the Supreme Court in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumb-
ers & Steamfilters Local Union No. 100.266 The unions appealed. In
support of the order of dismissal, defendants claimed that their conduct
was protected by both the statutory and the nonstatutory labor exemp-
tions to the antitrust laws, and also that the Sherman Act did not apply
to the alleged conduct, irrespective of the scope or applicability of the
labor exemptions.267
Of the two arguments asserted by defendants on appeal, the sec-
265. Id at 497-98.
266. 421 U.S. 616 (1975), discussed at 690 F.2d at 530. See Carpenters Local Union No. 1846
v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 509, 515-22 (E.D. La. 1981).
In Connell, the union, representing plumbers and mechanical tradesmen, sought to force
Connell, a general building contractor, from subcontracting mechanical work to non-union firms.
Initially, Connell refused to sign an agreement with the union committing it to subcontracting
only with firms that had a current bargaining agreement with the union. However, Connell signed
the agreement under protest when the union picketed one of Connell's major jobsites and shut it
down. Connell brought a suit against the union charging that the agreement violated the antitrust
laws. 421 U.S. at 619-21. The Fifth Circuit held that the agreement was lawful, reasoning that the
union's goal, organizing nonunion subcontractors, was a legitimate union interest and that efforts
to achieve that goal were immune from the antitrust laws. Id at 621. The Supreme Court agreed
that the goal was legitimate, but reversed on the question of the antitrust immunity, holding that a
union could be liable under the antitrust laws for coercing a "stranger employer," that is, one with
whom the union had no collective bargaining relationship, to agree not to use non-union subcon-
tractors. Id at 635.
The rationale for this holding was that the union's activity was not protected by labor's "non-
statutory" exemption to the antitrust laws. This exemption for "some union-employer agree-
ments" devolved from "the strong labor policy favoring the association of employees to eliminate
competition over wages and working conditions." Id at 622. The Court recognized that all union
activity has some potential effect on prices, and the "goals of federal labor law never could be
achieved" if an effect on prices were enough to subject union activity to antitrust scrutiny. As a
result, "labor policy requires tolerance for lessening of business competition based on differences
in wages and working conditions." Id However, the Court explained, "labor policy clearly does
not require. . . that a union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among those
who employ its members." Id The statutory exemption provides some protection for unions that
by unilateral action restrain product markets, but "the nonstatutory exemption offers no similar
protection when a union and a nonlabor party agree to restrain competition in a business market."
Id at 622-23. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the agreement between Connell and the
union could be the basis of an antitrust suit because "it has a potential for restraining competition
in the business market in ways that would not follow naturally from elimination of competition
over wages and working conditions." Id at 635.
267. 690 F.2d at 530, 531.
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ond is the most significant, for if the Sherman Act does not apply to the
employers' restraint upon the labor market, there is no need to decide
the scope or applicability of the labor exemptions. Carpenters Local
Union No. 1846 was the first case to articulate clearly this distinction
between the scope of the Sherman Act on the one hand, and the scope
of exemptions to its legitimate reach on the other.
The court inquired "whether, questions of antitrust exemption
aside, the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action under the antitrust
laws."26 Answering this question in the negative in either case would
have rendered irrelevant the issue of the scope of the statutory exemp-
tion, but Cordova did not even address it. The Fifth Circuit panel in
Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 did not make the same error. The
court stated:
[I]n order for a restraint of trade to be actionable under the Sherman
Act there must be a restraint upon commercial competition in the mar-
keting of goods or services. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader [citations omit-
ted]. We have held in Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers [citations omitted] that Apex requires such a restraint whether
the restraint is caused by a labor organization or an employer. 269
The court explained that "a concerted refusal to deal with a union"
may restrain "competition in the marketing of labor; it may have an-
ticompetitive effects on wages and working conditions. ' 270  But the
Court cautioned: "[T]his anticompetitive effect is not enough without
more to fulfill the requirements of the Sherman Act."' 2 7 1 Upon closer
inspection of the pleadings, the court concluded that plaintiffs had al-
leged a restraint of trade in the contractor services product market.272
The court acknowledged that the purpose of the agreement was to re-
268. Id at 531.
269. Id at 532.
270. Id
271. Id
272. The court said that most of the plaintiffs' pleadings did not allege antitrust injury; but,
applying the lenient rule of FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court decided that two theories were
pleaded "which do allege anticompetitive effects outside of the labor market per se." The essence
of the claim was that the purpose of the defendants' activity was to weaken the unions, but this
could be accomplished either by refusing to deal with the unions, which does not state an antitrust
cause of action, or by trying to drive other contractors hiring union members out of business,
which does state an antitrust claim. Id
The conclusion that the plaintiffs' complaint stated a Sherman Act claim was virtually com-
pelled by Connell. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 was the "ffip-side" of Connell in that the case
involved employers, instead of unions as in Connell, conspiring to coerce "stranger employers" to
agree not to use union-signatory contractors and subcontractors. (The term "flip-side" was em-
ployed in the argument of the unions in California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen.
Contractors, 648 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 885 (1983). If, as Connell indi-
cated, unions combining with employers to coerce stranger employers not to use union-signatory
subcontractors could have a direct effect on product market competition, then it followed that
multi-employer conduct to coerce other employers not to use union-signatory subcontractors
could also have a direct effect on the business market. Thus, on the authority of Connell, it was
19841
230 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:173
strain the labor market, but it concluded that "a restraint at the level of
the labor market itself does not state a claim of violation of the anti-
trust laws. 2 73
Since the court concluded that plaintiffs had pleaded that the chal-
lenged agreement affected product market competition, the question of
whether the employers' concerted activity was nevertheless exempt
from the Sherman Act became relevant. Defendants argued that their
conduct was protected by both the statutory and nonstatutory exemp-
tions that had been articulated in the Supreme Court's decision in Con-
nell.2 74 Defendants' nonstatutory exemption argument was rejected,
since the exemption is available only for agreements between a union
and an employer.275
Defendants' argument that their conduct was immunized from the
Sherman Act by the statutory labor exemption, which is derived from
three statutes including section 6 of the Clayton Act,27 6 was likewise
rejected. The Supreme Court has described the three statutes on which
the statutory exemption is based as "declar[ing] that labor unions are
not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and [as] ex-
empt[ing] specific union activities, including secondary picketing and
boycotts, from the operation of the antitrust laws. '2 77 This exemption
is not available when a union combines with a non-labor party.271 In
Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
exemption could not be used to protect concerted conduct by employ-
ers acting alone279 because the statutory exemption does not protect
business group conspiracies involving unions.
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 of
the scope of the statutory exemption, which derives in part from section
6, is correct. It might seem inconsistent for the court to conclude that
multi-employer conduct is not within the scope of the statutory labor
exemption to the antitrust laws while also concluding that multi-em-
ployer conduct restraining labor markets, which has no anticompetitive
effect in product markets, is not within the reach of the Sherman Act.
There is, however, no inconsistency in these conclusions. When con-
clear that the combination in Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 had the potential for unlawful
product market consequences.
273. 690 F.2d at 534.
274. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
275. 690 F.2d at 530 (citing Connell, 421 U.S. at 622); H.A. Artists & Assocs., Inc. v. Actors'
Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. at 716-17 n.19.
276. Id at 531. The other two are § 20 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 52, and § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104. See 421 U.S. at 621.
277. Connell, 421 U.S. at 621-22.
278. Id at 622.
279. 690 F.2d at 531 (these "exemptions are for the benefit of employees and their unions, and
offer no shelter for the acts of employers, except perhaps only incidentally").
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duct is not within the reach of the Act, the scope of an exemption be-
comes irrelevant.
Yet, if the first sentence of section 6 means what it says-specifi-
cally, that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce" to which the Sherman Act proscriptions apply-it might
appear that multi-employer conduct restraining labor markets should
be protected by the statutory exemption. Again, this is not so, because
the statutory exemption that the Supreme Court has applied is an ex-
emption for organized labor; therefore, to the extent that the statutory
exemption is derived from section 6, it depends on the second sentence
of that section, not the first. As discussed earlier, the first sentence of
section 6 of the Clayton Act reaffirms Congress' intent when it enacted
the Sherman Act, namely, that the Sherman Act is concerned with
product market competition, not with concerted employer activity in
labor markets that has no anticompetitive product market effect.28°
The second sentence of section 6 specifically protects "the existence and
operation of labor. . . organizations." If the first sentence of section 6
had not been appended to the language in the bill which eventually was
enacted into law, the statutory exemption would still be based on three
statutes, one of which would still be section 6 of the Clayton Act. Ac-
cordingly, there is no inconsistency between concluding that multi-em-
ployer conduct is outside the scope of the statutory labor exemption to
the antitrust laws and concluding that multi-employer conduct having
anticompetitive significance only in labor markets is not within the
reach of the Sherman Act.
2 California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated General
Contractors of California
Although its opinion lacks the clarity of the Fifth Circuit's opinion
in Carpenters Local Union No. 1846, the Ninth Circuit reached the
same result on similar facts in California State Council of Carpenters v.
Associated General Contractors of Calfornia.281 This decision was sub-
sequently reversed by the Supreme Court on the ground that the two
carpenters' unions that filed the action lacked standing, but the Ninth
Circuit's analysis of the scope of the Sherman Act was approved by the
Court.282 The two unions claimed that a contractor's association with
which the unions had entered into collective bargaining agreements for
several years and each of the association's individual members had vio-
lated section 1 by conspiring among themselves and with other industry
280. See supra notes 39-71 and accompanying text.
281. 648 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 885 (1983).
282. Id at 903 ("The Union's antitrust claims arise from alleged restraints caused by defend-
ants in the market for construction contracting and subcontracting ... . We think the Court of
Appeals properly assumed that such coercion might violate the antitrust laws").
19841
232 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:173
employers to boycott subcontractors who had entered into collective
bargaining agreements with the unions.183 The district court dismissed
the complaint on the ground that a union does not possess an antitrust
cause of action against an employer in a typical labor dispute.2 84 On
appeal, the unions argued that this case was the analogue of Connell
because it involved employers conspiring to coerce "stranger" employ-
ers to agree not to use union-signatory subcontractors, and that there-
fore the complaint did state a cause of action.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the union, holding that their argu-
ments did state a claim under the antitrust laws. CitingApex Hosiery,
the court explained that "[t]he Supreme Court has rejected the proposi-
tion that every arguable 'restraint' falls within the scope of the [Sher-
man] Act" and that "a showing of some form of restraint upon
commercial competition in the 'marketing of goods or services' is a pre-
requisite to the application of the Sherman Act." '85 As was the situa-
tion in Carpenters Local Union No. 1846, the court found that the
claims asserted by the unions alleged that the association's members
had done more than conspire to restrain the labor market. Indeed, the
defendants' activity, in addition to harming the union, also "could im-
pose a direct restraint on the business market which would affect com-
petition for goods and services in ways that would not follow naturally
from elimination of competition over wages and working condi-
tions." '86 Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal
of the antitrust claims.28 ' The court subsequently denied the employ-
ers' petition for rehearing, at the same time issuing an "explanation" of
part of its earlier opinion:
Agreements among employers are not, in themselves, violative of
the Sherman Act. To state a claim under the Sherman Act, one must
allege that such an agreement has either an anticompetitive purpose or
a substantial anticompetitive effect [citations omitted]. Thus, many in-
nocent agreements among employers, such as the bylaws of national
and local chambers of commerce, could not possibly be thought to fall
within the Sherman Act.
283. 648 F.2d at 529-30.
284. Id at 530.
285. Id at 531.
286. Id at 532.
287. Id at 540. Judge Sneed dissented from both the original opinion and from the order
supplementing that opinion. He disagreed with the majority as to the nature of plaintiffs' injury
and as to how Connell was being applied, but he agreed with the majority's premise that the
Sherman Act applies only to product market restraints:
The injury. . . [alleged by plaintiffs] is to the plaintiffs' organizational and representa-
tional efforts. An injury of this type without more is not within the ambit of the antitrust
law. Lacking is the restraint upon commercial competition in the marketing of goods
and services. . . Injuries to a union's organizational and representational efforts must
be redressed pursuant to the terms of the National Labor Relations Act.
Id at 542 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, mere elimination of competitiQn over wages and work-
ing conditions cannot give rise to an antitrust claim .... Thus, al-
though multi-employer bargaining units may affect or restrain
competition in the area of wages and working conditions, such re-
straints will not be considered to violate the antitrust laws. Accord-
ingly, the question of whether multi-employer bargaining units may be
exempt under one of the labor antitrust exemptions need not arise.
...In summary, an employer agreement falls within the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act only if it has an anticompetitive purpose or
effect on some aspect of competition other than competition over wages
288or working conditions.
3. Mid-America Regional Bargaining Association v. Will County
Carpenters District Council
The Seventh Circuit reached a result consistent with those in the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits, but the Seventh Circuit's analysis failed to
distinguish the legitimate reach of the Sherman Act from the scope of
exemptions to its reach. In Mid-American Regional Bargaining Associa-
tion v. Will County Carpenters District Council, 289 collective bargaining
representatives for construction contractors alleged that a wage agree-
ment entered into "outside the collective bargaining process" by a
union and a major employer had raised the cost of labor and had un-
dermined collective bargaining.290 The representatives contended that
the agreement was made at the instigation of the employer whose con-
struction projects had been halted by a work stoppage during negotia-
tion of a new collective bargaining agreement between the industry
representatives and the union. The district court dismissed the com-
plaint on the ground that the only direct restraint alleged in the com-
plaint "was a restraint in the market for human labor."
2 9
'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit began its analysis by defining the
scope of the labor exemptions, rather than by addressing the question
of the scope of the Sherman Act. The court read Apex Hosiery "as
establishing a nonstatutory exemption from Sherman Act coverage for
restraints acting primarily upon the labor market. ' 292 Thus, the court
reasoned, "a complaint must allege conduct operating as a direct re-
straint upon the business market" or else the complained-of activity is
"exempt from antitrust scrutiny." '2 9 3 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
agreed with the district court that the collective bargaining representa-
288. Id at 544.
289. 675 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 132 (1983).
290. Id at 882-83. See Mid-American Regional Bargaining Ass'n v. Will County Carpenters
Dist. Council, Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,821, at 78,407 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
291. 675 F.2d at 883.
292. Id at 890.
293. Id at 893.
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tives failed to state a claim because the complaint "alleged no more
than an agreement to restrain the labor market" and did not allege a
"direct restraint on the business market.
294
In cases where a labor union is involved, it will not change the
result if a court treats labor market restraints as "exempt" from the
Sherman Act, as did the Seventh Circuit in Mid-American Regional
Bargaining Association, rather than accepting the premise that the
Sherman Act does not purport to cover labor market restraints that
have no anticompetitive effects in a product market. Regardless of the
logic employed, multi-employer restraints on labor market competition
are not prohibited by the Sherman Act.
Nevertheless, there is a problem with the Seventh Circuit's analy-
sis. The court based its removal of the labor market restraint from
Sherman Act scrutiny on an "implied" exemption-which is what a
nonstatutory exemption is-instead of relying on statutory grounds as
it could have done. On several occasions, the Supreme Court has noted
that implied exemptions from the antitrust laws "[are] not favored and
not casually to be allowed." '29 5 Exemptions are implied only when
there is a "plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory pro-
visions. "296 At minimum, the implied nonstatutory exemption recog-
nized in Mid-America Regional Bargaining Association is based upon a
"clear repugnancy" between antitrust policy and national labor policy
favoring collective bargaining. However, under the Seventh Circuit's
analysis, a different, incorrect result could be reached where no union
is involved and no repugnant regulatory scheme can be identified. The
Sherman Act should not be applied to employer restraints in labor
markets, whether or not a union is involved, and the Seventh Circuit's
analysis does not clearly adopt this premise.
4. Cases Not Involving Union Activity
Using the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Mid-American Regional
Bargaining Association as an example, one might attempt to explain the
results in cases holding that concerted activity by either employers or
employees is not unlawful under the antitrust laws absent an anticom-
petitive effect in or intent to restrain a product market 297 as depending
294. Id
295. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 682 (1975).
296. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51 (1963).
297. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Wetterau Foods, 597 F.2d 133, 136 n.6 (8th Cir. 1979)
(court holds as a matter of law that alleged agreement among employers affecting only the labor
market did not violate the antitrust laws); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P.
Stevens & Co., Inc., 475 F. Supp. 482, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), vacated as moot, 638 F.2d 7 (2d Cir.
1980) (plaintiff's allegations do not state a claim under the antitrust laws because they merely
"complain of efforts to impede its activities as a union, entirely unaccompanied or uncomplicated
by any element of monopolistic effect upon competition in the marketplace for goods or services").
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on the exemption from the antitrust laws for organized labor.2 9 8 Under
this explanation, broad statements in these opinions concerning the in-
applicability of the Sherman Act to labor markets are merely ill-con-
sidered dicta. As noted earlier, these "ill-considered dicta" are firmly
grounded in the legislative history and policies of the Sherman Act.
2 9 9
Moreover, several cases not involving union activity have em-
ployed the distinction between product markets and labor markets to
describe the scope of the Sherman Act. These cases cannot be ex-
plained as resting upon an exemption for organized labor. Two of
these cases were decided prior to 1970. Both Union Circulation in the
Second Circuit and Nichols in the Seventh Circuit3 °° recognized that
concerted employer activity is unlawful under the Sherman Act only if
it has a purpose to affect or an anticompetitive effect in a product mar-
ket. Since 1970, two more federal circuit courts have stated that the
Sherman Act applies to restraints on commercial market competition in
situations where no union was involved.
One of those cases was decided by the Fifth Circuit in 1976, the
same circuit which followed Apex Hosiery in two cases involving labor
See also Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1134 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 877 (1974) (company shut down by non-employee picketing seeking to enjoin the picket-
ing as illegal under the Sherman Act fails to state a cause of action; court states that "[tihere is no
allegation or contention that the strike of the unions involved ...was for the purpose of re-
straining commercial competition in the marketing of goods or services, or that it has operated to
restrain commercial competition in some substantial way"); United Brick & Clay Workers v.
Junction City Clay Co., 158 F.2d 552, 554 (6th Cir. 1946) (where union charged several clay
companies with conspiracy to thwart union activity under Sherman Act, court said that the acts
complained of "do not come within the purview of the Sherman Antitrust Act, for they do not
allege the imposition by appellees of any form of restraint upon commercial competition in the
marketing of goods or service"). Cf. Thomsen v. Western Elec. Co., 680 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 348 (1983); Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, 511 F.
Supp. 1298, 1306, 1310 (E.D. Wash 1981) (where union alleged that an agreement among several
employers to conduct a lockout and engage in other collective action violated the Sherman Act,
court granted summary judgment for defendants because of, among other things, union's failure
to allege facts which show how [commercial] competition was adversely affected by Defendants'
conduct"); LK Productions, Inc. v. American Fed'n of Tel. & Radio Artists, 475 F. Supp. 251, 267
(S.D. Tex. 1979) (union action blacklisting television producer because he did not pay union scale
not unlawful because the "challenged conduct did not prevent [the producer] from competing in
any market, but merely required that if he was to compete, he must pay [union scale]").
298. When a collective bargaining agreement fixes wages or working conditions, it falls within
the protection of national labor policy and is exempt from the Sherman Act. E.g., Local Union
No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689-90 (1965). However,
even in this case, the Court has taken the position that for a term of a collective bargaining agree-
ment to lose the protection afforded by national labor policy there must be an intent to affect the
product market in a way not incidental to a legitimate labor market objective. Connell Constr.
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 635 (1975); Amalgamated
Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690 n.5; United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,
665-66 (1965). See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 200-09, 214-18 and accompanying text.
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unions.3 ' In Quinonez v. National Association of Securities Dealers,30 2
plaintiff, a securities sales representative, claimed that he was the vic-
tim of an illegal antitrust combination when, after being hired and fired
by two large dealers, a concerted employer boycott kept him from ob-
taining employment with any other firm. 3°3 He charged, inter alia, that
the monopolization of the securities business by a limited number of
firms, combined with "blackball exclusionary practices of these firms,"
injured the public "by reducing the number of securities sales repre-
sentatives and thus artificially reducing competition in the sale and
purchase of securities in the United States. 3 4 Defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff was predominately con-
cerned with the injury to his own business, but he did allege an effect of
the restraint on product market competition. Although the court's
opinion is not entirely clear, it ultimately followed Nichols, where the
allegation of a product market restraint was required, and held that
"no-switching agreements which allegedly impair competition among
the defendants and others are sufficient as a matter of law to state a
claim under the Sherman Act. 30
5
The First Circuit has also addressed this issue in a setting where
no union was involved. In Carroll v. Protection Maritime Insurance
Co. ,3o the plaintiffs, sailors and commercial fishers, alleged that a con-
spiracy among insurance companies had forced vessel owners not to
hire the plaintiffs. In holding that these allegations did not state a
claim under the antitrust laws, the court relied on the first sentence of
section 6:
As for the allegations that. defendants sought to create an unlawful
boycott of certain classes of seamen, the allegedly unlawful activity is
directed exclusively at the labor market, a market which the anti-trust
acts do not govern: "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or
article of commerce." 30
7
301. Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1982);
Prepmore Apparel, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 431 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
302. 540 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1976).
303. Id at 826.
304. Id at 827-28.
305. Id at 829. A fair reading of the case must note the court's reliance upon cases such as
Anderson, which has been read as not requiring an allegation of a restraint on product market
competition to make a § 1 claim, and Cordova, which did not require the allegation of a product
market effect. See id at 829 nn.8, 9. As a result, Quinonez has been cited as authority by one
court that concluded the Sherman Act does apply to labor market restraints. See Cesnik v.
Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 864 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). While Quinonez is correctly decided, it
appears that the court neither perceived the implications of applying the Sherman Act to labor
market restraints nor deemed it important to distinguish between product market and labor mar-
ket effects.
306. 512 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1975).
307. Id at 9-10.
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These cases, and others similar to them, 30 8 do not involve labor
organizations, and thus they cannot be explained as depending on an
exception from the Sherman Act for labor organizations. These cases
descend directly from Apex Hosiery's recognition that the Sherman Act
applies to product market restraints and not to labor market restraints
lacking an anticompetitive product market effect.
D. Cases Involving Professionals
Thus far, we have discussed two lines of cases addressing the scope
of the Sherman Act that have developed largely independently of each
other. Arguably, there is a third line of cases, distinct from the two
previously discussed categories, that involve professional services. The
most prominent of these cases involve alleged restraints in the market
for the services of professional athletes. Despite broad language in
some of the opinions,309 however, none really involves the question of
whether conduct affecting only the labor market violates the Sherman
Act.
Owners of professional sports franchises employ athletes to per-
form on their teams. The teams engage in athletic contests with other
teams, and all the teams are usually affiliated in a league. Players have
frequently alleged that employer-imposed player restraints, such as
player drafts and free agent rules, are employer combinations con-
demned by the antitrust laws. It is firmly established that the antitrust
laws apply to all professional sports except baseball,3 ° and the willing-
308. See Gutierrez v. E. & J. Gallo Winery Co., 604 F.2d 645, 646 (9th Cir. 1979) (court
affirms dismissal of complaint by farm workers alleging that employers had conspired to limit
hours per day and days per year worked by farm workers; court states that the allegations in-
volved "an effort to use the antitrust laws 'as a vehicle to achieve goals unrelated to the purposes
for which the antitrust laws were passed' "); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 308
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1976) ("[in addition the record is barren as to the actual
effect of these covenants on competition in the LP retail market"); Laborers' Dist. Council v.
McDonald, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 65,249, at 69,489 (D.C. Ariz. 1983) (allegation of conspir-
acy "to lower, fix, stabilize, and maintain the wages, conditions and terms of employment, i.e., the
price of labor" failed to state a claim); Daley v. St. Agnes Hospital, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1309, 1317
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (alleged boycott by hospitals of employee not actionable under the antitrust laws
because no "evidence of anti-competitive effect other than with regard to labor"); Taterka v. Wis-
consin Tel. Co., 394 F. Supp. 862, 865 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (agreement between telephone companies
not to hire plaintiff not actionable under the antitrust laws because inter alia, "no factual allega-
tions that competition is impaired"), aft'd without published opinion, 559 F.2d 1224 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 924 (1977); Miller v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 339 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (E.D. Wis.
1971) (agreement between employer and employee prohibiting post-employment disclosure of in-
formation required during course of employment not actionable under antitrust laws in absence of
restraint on commercial competition).
309. Eg., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d at 617-618; Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n v. Cheevers, 348 F. Supp. 261, 265 (D. Mass.), remanded, 472 F.2d 127 (1st Cir.
1972).
310. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, (1972); McCourt v. California Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193,
1197 (6th Cir. 1979).
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ness of courts to scrutinize player restraints suggests that the Sherman
Act does apply to labor market restraints, thereby calling into question
the continued validity of the Apex Hosiery analysis.
However, the fact that the Sherman Act is applicable to profes-
sional sports does not show that the antitrust laws apply to labor mar-
ket restraints. In professional sports, the product sold to the public by
team owners is the "game," or a combination of intra-league games
culminating in a league championship. 3 I Because the combination of
various players' services makes up the game, professional teams really
sell to the public the services of their players. As stated-if not under-
stated-by one court, "the service supplied to the public by a profes-
sional football club is highly dependent upon the ability of the players
employed by the club." '312 It follows that any restraint on competition
for the services of players inevitably affects the product market. 31 3 For
example, if professional teams were to restrain the labor market by
blacklisting a player, that would impair competition "as to the quality
of the service supplied, even though, as between player and club it is
only a restriction on freedom to employ. ' 3 4 Thus, the sports cases can-
not properly be used as precedent for the general proposition that con-
certed activity affecting only the market for labor is actionable under
the antitrust laws.
The professional sports cases, in addition to raising the question of
whether the Sherman Act is limited to commercial market restraints,
suggest a broader question involving professional services generally. It
is now well settled that the selling of professional services by, for exam-
ple, doctors and lawyers is subject to antitrust analysis under section 1
of the Sherman Act.3 15 It might be argued that professional services
311. See Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (NFL clubs "are
not competitors in any economic sense"). This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that in cases
charging illegal restraints in the market for players, the market relevant to determining the an-
ticompetitive effects has been held to be the market for the sport itself. Eg., Robertson v. Nat'l
Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 894 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v.
Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 500-02 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
312. Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332, 336 (7th Cir. 1967). Judge Mansfield
came close to acknowledging this relationship when he wrote in North Am. Soccer League v. Nat'l
Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 103 S. Ct. 499 (1982) that "player relations
• ..affect competition between member teams..." Id at 1257.
313. By this analysis, some enterprises which sell the services of their employees may be fixing
the price of the "product" when they nominally fix the wage or salary. Highly labor-intensive
enterprises, such as a law firm employing associate lawyers, may be selling a "product" in much
the same way as a professional sports team owner sells a product. Food service in restaurants is
highly labor intensive, but it is arguable that the product is the food, not what the waiter does
when he serves the food.
314. 371 F.2d at 336.
315. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 356, 363, 368-72 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); American
Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
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constitute the "labor of human beings" being sold in the labor mar-
ket;316 therefore, since the Sherman Act applies to these "labor market"
transactions, Apex Hosiery is no longer valid. However, the argument
is effectively answered by reference to the well-settled distinction be-
tween independent contractors and employees.
Courts have long held that an employer-employee relationship is a
prerequisite to applying the labor exemption in section 6.? 7 Under
these cases, the supplying of a service by an independent contractor is
not a labor market transaction, but is instead a product market transac-
tion. Professionals who sell their services to the public are independent
contractors.31" The entrepreneurial character of the work of lawyers,
for example, was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar,3 19 where the Court held a county minimum fee
schedule enforced by the state bar unlawful as illegal price fixing under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court spoke of the "business as-
pect" of the lawyer's examination of land titles in exchange for money,
and, citing United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,32°
noted the Sherman Act's design to bring within it "every person en-
gaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize com-
mercial intercourse among the states. ' 321' Therefore, since
professionals are independent contractors selling services in product
markets, those cases holding that the sale of professional services is
subject to the Sherman Act are not inconsistent with Apex Hosiery.
316. This argument appears never to have been raised by professionals arguing for an exemp-
tion from the antitrust laws. In the briefs in the cases cited supra in note 315, counsel did not
advance this argument. But see United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485,
489 (1950) (trial court, in deciding that real estate brokers could fix commissions, "seemingly was
influenced" by § 6 of Clayton Act).
317. Williams v. St. Joseph Hospital, 629 F.2d 448, 453 n.8 (7th Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Local
No. 7, International Union of Journeyman Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593, 605-06 (4th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied 384 U.S. 969 (1966); Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 651 (2d Cir. 1945). But see H.A. Artists
& Associates, Inc. v. Actors' Equity Ass'n, 451 U.S. 704, 717 n.20 (1981) ("a party seeking refuge
in the statutory exemption must be a bona fide labor organization, and not an independent con-
tractor or entrepreneur").
318. In effect, services sold by independent contractors are "commodities." For general pur-
poses, a laborer's services are human effort that has no existence apart from the person, while
commodities sold in the product market have an existence and value independent of the parties
who produce them. When a professional markets his services in connection with his "business,"
the professional converts what is presumptively a labor market transaction into a commercial
transaction, in effect converting his "labor" into a "commodity." Thus, the product market is
indeed a market for goods and some services. The services that are within the product market are
those services that are marketed and sold as if they were commodities.
319. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
320. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
321. 421 U.S. at 787-88 (quoting 322 U.S. at 553).
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VI
NEW FRAMEWORK: SYNTHESIS, APPLICATION, AND
IMPLICATIONS
A. Synthesis
The question we have considered is the extent to which the Sher-
man Act applies to employer restraints in labor markets. We conclude
that the Sherman Act should not be applied to employer restraints on
labor market competition when they have no purpose to restrain the
product market or do not produce an anticompetitive effect in that
market. To state a claim under the Sherman Act, a plaintiff challeng-
ing a multi-employer labor market restraint must allege that the re-
straint is intended to affect or actually has an unreasonable
anticompetitive effect in the product market. All labor market re-
straints have some influence upon the functioning of product markets
since such restraints affect cost, which in turn has a secondary effect on
price, but not all labor market restraints result from illegal intentions or
lead to unlawful product market effects. Indeed, some labor market
restraints might have pro-competitive product market effects. An alle-
gation that a multi-employer restraint is intended to restrain the labor
market or has an anticompetitive effect solely in that market does not
state a claim under the Sherman Act. The legislative history of the
Sherman Act and section 6 of the Clayton Act supports this analysis.322
Moreover, examination of the policies of the Sherman Act demon-
strates that the Act is a blunt instrument inappropriate for promoting
competition in labor markets.323
In Apex Hosiery, the Supreme Court first articulated the proposi-
tion that the Sherman Act applies to product market restraints and not
to labor market restraints whose effects are limited to the labor mar-
ket. 24 Since that decision, two largely independent lines of cases ad-
dressing the scope of the Sherman Act have developed. One line, of
which Cordova is the leading case, has incorrectly focused on the scope
of the exemption in section 6 and has assumed that, in the absence of
an applicable exemption, the Sherman Act applies to employer re-
straints in labor markets.325 The other line has followed the Apex Ho-
siery theme that the Sherman Act applies to product market restraints
but not to labor market restraints that have no product market effect.32 6
If the Cordova line of cases stands for the proposition that the
Sherman Act was intended, and should be used, to promote competi-
322. See supra text accompanying notes 132-92.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 19-32.
324. See supra notes 148-92 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 221-61 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 262-308 and accompanying text.
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tiol among einployers in labor markets because ensuring competitive
labor markets is an objective of the Sherman Act, then those cases are
wrong. The Sherman Act was not intended to promote competition in
labor markets and should not be used to achieve that objective. If,
however, those cases are based on the unstated assumption that all la-
bor restraints have some potential product market effect, and that
therefore all multi-employer restraints in labor markets need to be
scrutinized under the Sherman Act, then those cases are not necessarily
incorrect. Indeed, such a reading of Cordova and its kindred would
significantly narrow the gap between that line of cases and the line de-
volving from Apex Hosiery.
Nevertheless, if the plaintiff in Cordova had a Sherman Act claim
based on the anticompetitive product market consequences of the
multi-employer agreement to reduce the commissions paid to the secur-
ities representatives they employed, he did not plead it. Instead, plain-
tiff alleged only the existence of a labor market restraint and its effect
on the income of the employees. Without an allegation that the chal-
lenged restraint had a purpose to restrain the product market or an
unlawful, anticompetitive effect in that market, plaintiff, contrary to the
court's holding, failed to state a claim.
In short, all labor market restraints bear some relationship to a
product market, since a labor market restraint affects cost, which has a
secondary effect on price. However, some labor market restraints have
pro-competitive product market effects, some labor market restraints
have anticompetitive product market effects, and other labor market
restraints have absolutely no measurable effect on product market com-
petition. Challenges to labor market restraints that are alleged only to
have a purpose to restrain the labor market or an anticompetitive effect
in a labor market do not state claims under the Sherman Act.
This analytical framework is suggested, if not required, by the
Supreme Court's opinion in Apex Hosiery.3 27 A plaintiff who chal-
lenges a multi-employer labor market restraint on the ground that it
has depressed wages or otherwise affected conditions of employment
fails to state a Sherman Act claim. A plaintiff who alleges an unlawful
product market consequence of the labor market restraint states a
claim, which must be evaluated under the ordinary substantive tests for
antitrust liability.
Under these ordinary substantive antitrust rules, conduct of em-
ployers who act in concert to stabilize wages for the purpose of fixing
product price is illegalper se. This follows from the substantive anti-
trust principle that a purpose to fix product price renders the chal-
lenged restraint illegalper se under section 1 of the Sherman Act, even
327. See supra notes 148-92 and accompanying text.
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though the agreeing firms lack the power to affect prices or simply fail
to affect product price.328 In the absence of a purpose to stabilize prod-
uct price, multi-employer agreements to stabilize wages are not illegal
per se, since these agreements are not the kinds of restraints that inevi-
a bly have "pernicious effect on competition" in the product market or
lack "any redeeming virtue.'"329 Such restraints could actually enhance
product market competition, instead of impede it.330 If the product
market consequence of the labor market restraint is anticompetitive,
and if, after "analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of
the restraint, and the reasons it was imposed,"'33 1 it is determined under
the Rule of Reason that the pro-competitive effects (if any) of the re-
straint are outweighed by the restraint's anticompetitive effects, then
the restraint is unlawful. Problems of proof for the plaintiff in such a
case are substantial,332 but suppose an employee-plaintiff is able to
demonstrate the following: (1) that all law firms in a particular city
agreed to decrease the salaries of their associates in order to encourage
associates to leave the firms and work in some other city; (2) that the
demand for legal services in the city is inelastic; and (3) that the de-
crease in the number of associates in the city decreases the law firms'
output, which causes the price charged for the firms' services to be bid
up. The law firms' labor market restraint has the consequence of re-
ducing output in the product market, thereby increasing price. The
anticompetitive effects in the product market outweigh pro-competitive
benefits (which are non-existent), and the restraint is unreasonable.
The application of this framework to a situation where multi-employer
conduct is likely to be challenged is discussed in the next section.
The ultimate disposition of plaintiff's claim in Cordova helps to
illustrate what happens when this analytical framework is ignored.333
Judge Mansfield refused to dismiss the allegations involving wage
fixing;334 however, after trial on the merits, Judge Ward335 found that
the challenged agreements among employers to exclude certain
amounts from the computation of commissions paid their employees
were not illegal. Judge Ward appeared to treat wage fixing, outside the
context of collective bargaining, as price fixing, citing Judge Mans-
field's opinion as authority along with a comment that research failed
328. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940); L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 11, at 185.
329. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
330. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
331. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 692.
332. See infra text accompanying notes 367-75.
333. Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd, 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
334. 321 F. Supp. at 605-06.
335. Judge Mansfield was appointed to the Second Circuit while the case was pending.
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to disclose another case like it.336 Surprisingly, however, Judge Ward
refused to concede that regulation of a "single element of compensation
• ..was a scheme to fix or stabilize prices." 337 He reasoned that be-
cause there was no purpose to fix prices, application of theper se rule
was inappropriate. Instead, he concluded that this was a "type of ar-
rangement" to which the rule of reason applied.33' Applying the rule
of reason, Judge Ward concluded that the challenged agreement to re-
duce commissions did not violate the antitrust laws. He found that the
plaintiffs may have received "less money than they would have" absent
the employers' agreement to reduce their commissions, but that this
was not "conclusively demonstrated. ' 339 He also found that there was
"no stabilizing effect on wages," and under those circumstances
"[c]ompetition continued unabated. ' 3 °
Judge Ward's application of substantive antitrust principles is un-
tenable. If Cordova had been a product price-fixing case, Judge Ward's
conclusion that the sellers conspired to fix an element of price would
have required finding aper se violation.34' Moreover, if the Sherman
Act is concerned with labor market competition, naked wage fixing, as
the corollary to price fixing, should beper se unlawful. Judge Ward's
failure to reach the result required by ordinary application of substan-
tive antitrust principles is significant. Perhaps he perceived the disrup-
tive implications of applying substantive antitrust principles wholesale
in labor markets. If Judge Ward possessed this foresight, his opinion
should be read as a successful effort to circumvent the natural conse-
quences of Judge Mansfield's opinion while appearing to give the ear-
lier decision the weight it deserved as the law of the case.
Also, although this point is not clear, Judge Ward seemed to find
that the agreement among defendants was a reasonable restraint on la-
bor market competition. Such an approach is not consistent with the
framework we outline here, because the Sherman Act is not concerned
with labor market competition as such. If instead Judge Ward had
concluded that the challenged agreement among the employers to re-
duce the commissions was reasonable because of the absence of an an-
ticompetitive effect in the product market, then Judge Ward would
have adopted the approach urged in this article.342
336. 377 F. Supp. at 95.
337. Id
338. Id at 96.
339. Id
340. Id
341. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 222-24.
342. In Judge Mansfield's opinion, such a conclusion would have corrected the errors we
identified earlier. See supra notes 227-51 and accompanying text. Because of the deference Judge
Ward had to give Judge Mansfield's earlier order as law of the case, this approach was not avail-
able to Judge Ward.
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Finally, concluding that the Sherman Act does not limit concerted
employer activity in labor markets in the absence of unlawful product
market consequences raises the question of who has standing to chal-
lenge employer restraints in labor markets. If the Sherman Act is con-
cerned with promoting competition among employers in the labor
market, an employee-plaintiff who asserts that his wages have been de-
pressed because of the restraint clearly has standing. If, however, to
state a claim under the Sherman Act it is essential to plead an illegal
product market restraint, an employee who merely asserts that his
wages have been depressed by the labor market restraint with a result-
ing unlawful product market effect may not have standing to challenge
the restraint.343
The questions of whether a cause of action exists and whether
there is standing are conceptually distinct issues. 3 "n Under section 4 of
the Clayton Act, 345 a person injured "by reason of anything forbidden
in the antitrust laws" may recover three times his damages. However,
not every person injured by an antitrust violation will recover treble
damages because of that violation. The scope of this provision, which
if taken literally would be unworkably broad, has been narrowed by
courts through the standing requirement. 46 Employees claiming anti-
trust injury from concerted activity of firms competing with their em-
ployers or from illegal activity in which their employers participated
have frequently been denied standing on the ground that their injuries
were too remote from the restraints in question. 347  Yet standing has
343. An employee who alleges that he was damaged because he purchased a good manufac-
tured by one of the defendants, the price of which was inflated because of the secondary effect of
the labor market restraint, has standing under prevailing standing rules. L. SULLIVAN, supra note
11, at 771.
344. Association of Gen. Contractors of California v. California State Council of Carpenters,
103 S. Ct. 897, 904 (1983); Carpenters Local Union No. 1846 v. Pratt-Farnsworth, Inc., 690 F.2d
489, 536 (5th Cir. 1982).
345. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1980).
346. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 770; In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d
514, 515 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1261 (1983).
347. Eg., In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation, 681 F.2d at 514 (former corporate presi-
dent who was terminated by employer and blacklisted by the industry for alleged refusal to par-
ticipate in conduct illegal under the antitrust laws did not suffer an antitrust injury affording him
standing); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938
(1973) (former employee of one of two corporations, that employee claimed merged illegally, lack-
ed standing); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 919 (1952) (members of unions (and others), who were former employees of
major studios whom the studios refused to rehire, sued another union and the studios on an agree-
ment that allegedly had the effect of destroying smaller movie studios; former employees alleged
they lost wages as a result of this agreement, but court held they lacked standing; "appellants'
connection with the alleged illegal conspiracy is not such as would bring them within the contem-
plation of the anti-trust law. . . [t]he damage alleged to have been suffered by appellants does not
flow from any injury to the competitive situation of the motion picture industry"); Plumbers &
Steamfitters Local 598 v. Morris, Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,898 (E.D. Wash. 1981) (employees lack-
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been found where the employee is the immediate object of the restraint,
as is the case where employers have conspired not to hire a particular
employee.348 Considerable confusion persists in this area.349
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Associated General Con-
tractors of California v. California State Council of Carenters3 ° has
clarified some of the uncertainty surrounding antitrust standing, but
the Court specifically left open the question whether the "direct victim"
of illegal concerted activity "who suffers a type of injury unrelated to
antitrust policy, may recover damages when the ultimate purpose of the
[activity] is to restrain competition in the relevant economic market."35'
Unlike the unions in Associated General Contractors that the Court
found to lack standing, the employee who claims his wages have been
depressed by concerted employer activity is the "direct victim" of the
restraint. However, the employee does not suffer an injury that the an-
titrust laws are designed to remedy. Thus, if an employee-plaintiff's
only claimed injury is that his wages were reduced, it is an open ques-
tion whether, in alleging that his employer has violated the Sherman
Act by restraining the labor market and thereby causing an unreasona-
ble effect on price, he possesses standing.
ed standing to assert an antitrust claim based on an agreement to conduct a lockout); Clune v.
Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 214 F. Supp. 520, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (where employees
challenged under antitrust laws an agreement among competing newspapers that all would sus-
pend publication if one were involved in a strike, court refuses to enjoin newspapers from abiding
by agreement, stating that "It]he reason plaintiffs are affected is not that trade or commerce. . . is
restrained, but because the economic pressure of employers against employees affects their em-
ployment"). But see Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated and
remanded, 51 U.S.L.W. 3633 (1983).
348. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., 670 F.2d at 1378 (former sales manager who was termi-
nated and blacklisted by the industry for refusing to participate in conduct illegal under the anti-
trust laws possessed standing under § 4 to seek damage allegedly caused him by his employer's
and other manufacturers' boycott of his services); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332
(7th Cir. 1967) (employee had standing to attack agreement of potential employers not to hire
him); Freeman v. Eastman-Whipstock, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 685, 689 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (employee
alleging that employers conspired to prevent his employment in the oil well surveying industry
had standing to sue the employers).
349. As the previous two footnotes indicate, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have reached
contradictory results on substantially the same facts. Moreover, each Circuit has arguably contra-
dicted its own earlier decisions. The Ninth Circuit in Ostrofe did not discuss its previous decision
in Conference of Studio Unions, though it did acknowledge that its prior decisions had not been
"clear and consistent." 670 F.2d at 1383 n.7. In Industrial Gas the Seventh Circuit specifically
approved Judge Kennedy's dissent in Ostrofe. Also, the Seventh Circuit in Industrial Gas at-
tempted to distinguish its previous decision in Nichols as involving a conspiracy "intended to
restrict competitive conditions in the labor market;" thus, "the injuries complained of, restriction
of employment alternatives, were directly related to the anticompetitive restraints." 681 F.2d at
517. Since the employee's injury "did not result from a lack of competition in the labor market,"
the employee in Industrial Gas-unlike the employee in Nichols-lacked an "antitrust injury."
Id at 517. The possible relationship between Industrial Gas and Nichols regarding the scope of
the Sherman Act is discussed at supra note 217 and accompanying text.
350. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
351. Id at 910 n.44.
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B. Application of the New Framework to Multi-employer Efforts to
Stabilize Wages
In the future, employee claims that employers have restrained the
labor market in violation of the Sherman Act are likely to involve an
examination of the current widespread use of wage surveys. The ex-
change of wage and salary data makes naked wage fixing easier, and
there are strong incentives for tacit wage fixing. Two recent articles
argued that the use of wage surveys might violate the federal antitrust
laws,352 but neither examined the underlying issue in the argument:
whether the Sherman Act applies to employer restraints in labor mar-
kets.353 Having proposed a framework for applying the Sherman Act
to multi-employer restraints in labor markets, we can now examine
how claims based on the use of wage surveys should be resolved within
that framework.
1. Significance of Wage Surveys
Wage stabilization can be achieved by either a naked or a tacit
restraint. Naked wage fixing, where two or more employers simply
agree what wage will be offered the labor force, is the starkest example
of an employer-imposed labor market restraint. If the labor force is
immobile and a substantial number of employers who are product mar-
ket competitors cooperate, then the employers, acting collectively as a
monopsonist, can set the wage at a low level; this allows the colluding
firms to maximize their joint profits. 354 Employers who-are not product
market competitors but who nevertheless compete for the same labor
supply would also benefit from naked wage fixing, either in the form of
greater profits or the ability to decrease prices without decreasing
profits.
352. Cohen, Information and Antitrust." Information Exchanges Relating to Wages and Other
Conditions of Employment, 32 LAB. L.J. 55 (1981); Velvel, The Legality Under the Antitrust Laws of
Wage Statistics Compiled by ProfessionalAssociations, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 729 (1978).
353. Cohen merely asserted the validity of the analogy in a footnote and did not analyze it:
"The antitrust analysis of information exchanges relating to conditions of employment mirrors the
antitrust analysis of other information exchanges, including price information exchanges." Co-
hen, supra note 352 at 55 n.3. Velvel did not articulate the premise that principles applicable to
the market for goods and services apply to the market for labor, but simply concluded that an
"agreement to fix the price of labor" would be "illegal per se" under the antitrust laws. Velvel,
supra note 352 at 731.
One commentator, in the course of a discussion on multi-employer mutual aid, concluded
that the antitrust laws apply only to commercial or product markets and do not apply to labor
markets. Comment, Employers' Mutual Aid No Antitrust Laws Need Apply and Almost All's Fair
in Industrial War, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1145, 1149-51 (1976).
354. This statement necessarily assumes that other variables are constant. For example, if the
firm depends on the well-being of its employees, as is the case where the employees are also the
firm's consumers, then the firm has an incentive not to set the wage at the lowest possible level.
See Winter, supra note 75, at 14, 26-27.
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Short of naked wage fixing, employers might "tacitly" fix wages, in
a manner akin to parallel pricing behavior.355 The existence of natural
pressures toward tacit wage fixing was recognized by Adam Smith
more than two centuries ago:
Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and
uniform combination, not to raise the wages of labour above their ac-
tual rate. To violate this combination is every where a most unpopular
action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbors and
equals. We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the
usual, and one may say, the natural state of things which nobody ever
hears of.3 5 6
These pressures are still operative today: like their eighteenth-cen-
tury counterparts, most modem employers are unwilling to pay work-
ers more than their "actual rate. ' 357 The uniformly low wages earned
by domestic help in particular neighborhoods, where no employer
wants to be the first to raise the rate of compensation, is but one exam-
ple of the continued existence of this "natural state of things." On the
other hand, employers are rarely willing to offer wages and benefits
substantially below the prevailing rate of compensation for similar
work. A low-paying employer may be able to retain its work force in
the short run; however, in the long run, an employer that pays too little
will not only lose its employees to competing employers but will also
find itself unable to hire employees with minimally acceptable skills
and aptitudes.
Adam Smith did not explain how the eighteenth-century masters
determined the "actual rate" of labor's wage. Perhaps it was nothing
more complicated than discussing, over a pint of ale, the wages paid a
blacksmith's helper. Today, the exchange of information which facili-
tates naked or tacit wage stabilization is much more systematized.
Most employers engage in some sort of organized activity to collect and
evaluate information about the level of wages other employers provide
to their work forces. Wage surveys,358 in particular, play an extremely
important role in the compensation decisions of most modem
employers.359
355. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
356. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 66-67 (Mod. Ch. Ed. 1937).
357. This statement assumes that most employers participate in a labor market in which the
labor supply is relatively static and immobile. When the supply of labor is scarce, employers will
compete for the limited supply by offering higher wages. In most markets, however, employers
are not required to secure their labor force by bidding up the price of labor. See Winter, supra
note 75, at 26-28.
358. The surveys referred to in this article may collect wage data, salary information, or data
concerning the types of levels of fringe benefits. Hereafter, all such surveys will be referred to as
"wage surveys."
359. See N. TOLLES & R. RAIMON, SOURCES OF WAGE INFORMATION: EMPLOYER ASSOCIA-
TIONS (hereinafter "ToUes and Raimon") 236 (1952) (among 170 wage surveys for which incep-
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Despite the wide use of wage surveys, generalizations about them
are difficult because the surveys vary widely in significant respects. For
example, the sources and methods used in collecting wage survey data
are extremely diverse. Manufacturing associations use questionnaires
to collect wage, salary, and benefit information, which is then dissemi-
nated to their members. Some employers conduct their own surveys,
either by collecting data through formal methods, or, as is more often
the case, by exchanging information informally, such as through a
meeting of personnel directors of two or more companies or via a sim-
ple telephone request from one employer to another for the hourly
wage being paid a particular job description. Whether wage survey
data are collected by association or by individual employers, or by for-
mal or informal methods, employers provide information about their
wages and benefits on the understanding, either express or implied, that
other employers will do the same.
Furthermore, many types of information are generated from a
wage survey. Some surveys show only composite information, such as
the lowest, highest, and average wages for a particular job. Some
surveys, however, specifically identify which employers pay what
wages, and some of these surveys show each employer's projections of
its future wages. Usually, surveys collect information both from em-
ployers who compete in the market for goods and services and from
those who do not, but some surveys are limited to those employers who
compete in the same product market. Some surveys are confined geo-
graphically. This is particularly true of surveys conducted by individ-
tion dates are available, 27 were started prior to 1940, 30 were started between 1940 and 1944, and
103 were started between 1945 and 1951); R. LESTER, COMPANY WAGE POLICIES: A SURVEY OF
PATTERNS OF EXPERIENCE 10 (1948); C. BALDERSTON, WAGE SETrING BASED ON JOB ANALYSIS
58-59 (1940) (surveys have been used "for a number of years"); Cohen, Information and Antitrust.-
Information Exchanges Relating to Wages and Other Conditions of Employment, 32 LAB. L.J. 55,
60 (1981) ("[v]irtually all employers engage in some type of program to compile and assess com-
petitive information on the wages, benefits, and other conditions of employment of their employ-
ees"); L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 188 (7TH ED. 1978); R.
STOCKTON, WAGE POLICIES AND WAGE SURVEYS: A STUDY OF PRACTICES IN OHIO MANUFAC-
TURING 5 (1959). Although no reported decision has yet discussed the antitrust implications of
wage surveys, there are a number of decided cases involving disputes over surveys or otherwise
referring to wage surveys, thereby providing further evidence of their widespread use. Eg.,
NLRB v. Hasbro Industries, Inc., 672 F.2d 978, 988-89 (1st Cir. 1982) (in defending unfair labor
practice charge company argued that amount of wage increases was determined by wage surveys);
Eastern Maine Medical Center v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1981) (nurses wages tied to
community wage surveys); Florida Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 1981) (com-
pany policy to grant wage increases based on wage surveys); Texas Instruments, Inc. v. NLRB,
599 F.2d 1067, 1069 (1st Cir. 1979) (company conducts annual wage surveys among area employ-
ers for wages and benefits for specific jobs); Delchamps, Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 476, 478, 480 (5th
Cir. 1979) (company surveys wage levels of competitors); NLRB v. Planters Peanuts, 574 F.2d 400,
402 (8th Cir. 1978) (recently prescribed company policy that local wage surveys be conducted at
each plant at least once a year); General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177, 1178 (6th Cir. 1972)
(company had conducted wage surveys at four plant locations for a number of years).
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ual employers, who are likely to collect data from other employers in
an area surrounding a particular plant or outlet. A geographically con-
fined survey is likely to include companies which do not compete in the
product market but which do compete for the services of the available
labor supply. In contrast to geographically restricted surveys, some
surveys collect information from employers throughout the United
States. These surveys may be limited to employers who compete in the
same product market, or they may include companies who are merely
thought to be competing for the same labor supply.
Wage survey information, once collected, can be used for a variety
of purposes.36° One important, perhaps overriding, purpose of survey
data is to give assurance to employers that their employees will not
leave in the future because of inadequate compensation. When an em-
ployer uses a survey in this manner, the function of the survey is merely
to alert the employer when its wages and benefits become grossly defi-
cient. Of course, data may also be used in negotiating compensation on
an individual basis with salaried employees, and plainly, in collective
bargaining, wage survey data assists the employer in formulating its
bargaining strategy. Almost all rational employers, however, rely to
some extent on surveys in setting their compensation levels. The reli-
ance may be total; for example, an employer may have a policy of pay-
ing its employees a predetermined percentage of a composite wage in a
particular area. Short of total reliance, an employer may use survey
data as one factor among several in setting its compensation levels.
The widespread reliance of employers upon wage surveys in set-
ting compensation levels has two potentially significant antitrust impli-
cations. First, the availability and free exchange of information
facilitates naked wage fixing by those employers inclined to the prac-
tice. Second, short of overt wage fixing, the availability of information
about what other employers are paying their work force reinforces nat-
ural tendencies toward wage stability, thereby encouraging "tacit"wage
fixing.
Because the use of wage surveys is widespread, most employers are
in potential violation of the Sherman Act if the Act is concerned with
labor market competition. Of course, if the Sherman Act does prohibit
employer restraints in labor markets regardless of the product market
consequences of those restraints, any employer basing a compensation
360. See R. STOCKTON, supra note 359, at 43-44 ("wage comparison policy" has several ad-
vantages, including assisting employers in recruiting from the labor market, increasing employee
satisfaction, and decreasing employee turnover). Whatever the purpose, as a general rule, the
wage survey data is kept strictly confidential; employees are not given access to it. In Texas In-
struments, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1981), the court held that the employer had a
propriety interest in the confidentiality of its wage survey data, and a company security rule pro-
tecting the information was valid. Id at 831-33.
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decision upon wage survey data could be violating the Sherman Act.
Given the widespread use of wage surveys, this prospect is staggering:
none of the commentators who believes that the Sherman Act is con-
cerned with labor market competition has either mentioned wage
surveys or considered the implications of making employers potentially
liable for this longstanding, widespread practice.36'
2. Resolving Employee Challenges to Multi-employer Use of Wage
Surveys
Simply put, under traditional tests for substantive antitrust liabil-
ity, a plaintiff must prove concerted activity, the intent of which is to
stabilize product price or the effect of which on price is unreasonably
anticompetitive. Assuming that an employee-plaintiff has standing to
assert an antitrust claim challenging the use of wage surveys, it is
doubtful that he would prevail. First, an employee faces substantial
obstacles in establishing that the employer restrained the labor market
with the intent of stabilizing the product price.362 With naked wage
fixing, it is not likely that a plaintiff will be able to prove an intent to fix
the product price, with the possible exception of those situations where
labor cost is such a high percentage of the product price that fixing
labor cost is tantamount to fixing the product price. Where wages are
but a small part of product cost, it is not likely that employers would fix
wages for the purpose of fixing prices. A firm that intends to fix prices
is likely to reach an agreement with the competitor on price to be
charged rather than on the wages to be paid. In short, an employer
may have participated in a wage survey with the intent of fixing wages,
but it is quite another matter to establish that the employer intended to
fix prices.
Thus, it is likely that most plaintiffs will not assert that employers
restrained the labor market with an intent to stabilize product price,
but will instead claim that the employer-imposed labor market restraint
had an unreasonable anticompetitive effect upon the product market.
Whether there is even a plausible claim of price stabilization caused by
participation in a wage survey and the use of wage survey data depends
on the nature of the wage survey.363 Some surveys are not even capa-
ble of causing an effect on product price. Many surveys compile infor-
mation collected from companies who are not competitors in the
361. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
362. The existence of an opportunity to fix wages does not establish that wages were fixed.
See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 575, 585 (1925) (competitors had
meetings at which they could have agreed on prices, but court gave no weight to this fact because
they had not done so; exchange of price information provided a basis for illegal agreement, but no
liability because of lack of proof of such an agreement).
363. See supra text accompanying notes 358-60.
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product market. An exchange of information among those who are not
competitors is not a violation of the Sherman Act, even if price infor-
mation is being exchanged instead of wage information.
The situation becomes more problematical when competitors ex-
change wage information, but employee-plaintiffs still face substantial
hurdles. The employee is unlikely to be able to demonstrate an effect
of the use of the wage surveys upon the product market. Agreements to
conduct wage surveys are clearly not unreasonableper se. Neither are
agreements to exchange information on prices of goods illegalper se.36
Considering the various federal policies favoring the regulation of la-
bor market wage rates,365 exchange of wage information is certainly not
366illegalper se.
Thus, multi-employer participation in and use of wage surveys
would give an employee-plaintiff a claim for damages only if the use
"unreasonably" restrained trade.367 A plaintiff would have to demon-
strate unreasonableness by showing that surveys are "reasonably calcu-
lated to prejudice the public interest. ' 368 Such a demonstration would
in turn require proof of a significant "impact upon competitive condi-
tions in a definable product market. ' 369 This proof is difficult to assem-
ble. The surveys themselves show that their use has not resulted in
wage uniformity, 370 let alone price uniformity. Most surveys demon-
strate an unusually large difference between wages paid by survey par-
ticipants in the same job description. Rate ranges of up to fifty percent
exist in some surveys. City-wide surveys by the United States Bureau
of Statistics "commonly show a rate range of the order of 20 to 30 per-
cent" for a particular job.371
One reason that wage surveys have not led to wage uniformity is
364. E.g., United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975).
365. Agreements involving price are unreasonableper se because federal policy in the market
for goods and services "protects that vital part of our economy against any degree of interference"
with prices, no matter how benign the intent. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 221 (1940). On the other hand, federal policy in the labor market is largely premised on
interference with the free setting of wage rates. See supra text accompanying notes 10 1-32.
366. E.g., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 354-355 (2nd Cir.) (agreements to require arbitra-
tion provisions not illegalper se in labor context, even though illegal per se in services context),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 948 (1978), Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 865 (M.D. Tenn.
1980) (alleged boycott of employees not illegal per se); Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 86
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (agreement fixing term of compensation not illegal per se because not price
fixing), afl'd, 520 F.2d 1231 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053 (1976).
367. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (1978).
368. Cesnik v. Chrysler Corp., 490 F. Supp. 859, 867 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
369. E.g., Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286, 291 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 447 U.S.
924 (1980).
370. See Altemose Constr. Co. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 443 F. Supp. 492, 504
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (wage-fixing agreement cannot be found when a "wide divergence" exists "in the
wages paid in each job category").
371. L. REYNOLDS, LABOR EcONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 185 (1978).
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the inherent difficulty of using wage surveys to determine what wages
to pay. The data obtained in surveys typically are not comparable, be-
cause of differences in job functions across the same job titles and be-
cause of distinctions among worker quality which are not reflected in
most wage comparisons, even assuming that quality can be measured
effectively.372 Since wage surveys have not had an ascertainable effect
in promoting wage uniformity, it is difficult to argue persuasively that
surveys have had an adverse effect on competition in product markets.
Even if a wage survey had an ascertainable effect on wage levels
among competitors, or if employers fixed wages directly, the link be-
tween wage uniformity and impaired competition in a product market
would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. Higher wages do not
necessarily lead to higher total costs because the ratio of labor costs to
total costs varies within industries.373 One commentator has observed
that economic gains from a high-wage position can offset the higher
wage costs through gains in worker quality, superior employee per-
formance, decreased turnover, increased managerial efficiency, and
other advantages.374 Moreover, variations in the efficiency of plant,
equipment, and management cause changes in wage levels to have dis-
parate effects on total costs. 37 5 Because the relationship of wages to
total costs varies from company to company, the relationship between
wage uniformity and lessened competition in the product market is, at
best, remote.
Judged under the rule of reason, agreements to base compensation
on the results of the surveys should fare no worse than express agree-
ments fixing aspects of compensation, which some courts have held to
be lawful.37 6 Moreover, wage surveys and their use are so common and
their use so varied and respected that it is difficult to imagine a court
considering illegal a mere agreement to participate in a survey. The
nearly universal and long-unchallenged use of wage surveys is itself
substantial evidence of their legality.3
77
Even if wage surveys were not of such longstanding and wide-
372. Id at 185-86; R. STOCKTON, supra note 360, at 99.
373. Cox, supra note 17 1, at 278; Scheinholtz & Kettering, supra note 22, at 361-62.
374. L. REYNOLDS, supra note 370, at 187-88. Because worker quality increases, the company
should be able to impose a stricter hiring standard, and recruitment costs should be expected to
decline. Nonunion companies may gain "insurance" against unionization by a high-wage policy,
while a high-wage policy may reduce losses from labor disputes and work stoppages in a union-
ized company. Also, a high-wage policy is likely to increase psychological satisfaction of manage-
ment and employees, which could increase company profits. Id
375. Cox, supra note 171, at 279.
376. Eg., Jacobi v. Bache & Co., 520 F.2d 1231, 1238-40 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1053 (1976).
377. Eg., Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 436 U.S. 948
(1978) (agreements among employers to impose arbitration clauses on employees not illegal under
the antitrust laws because, inter alia, of widespread use of such agreements).
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spread use, it would be difficult to conclude that their use prejudices the
public interest or is otherwise contrary to the Sherman Act's policies.
To the extent that such surveys lead to wage uniformity, they are con-
sistent with federal policy that wage rates among employers for the
same job should be comparable.37 8 To the extent that wage surveys
assist an employer in keeping its employees by paying the prevailing
wage, the surveys support the public interest in employment stability.
Even if the only effect of wage surveys were to reduce average wages,
that effect does not offend the articulated antitrust objective of lower
prices for goods and services. There is no articulated federal policy
that wages should be as high as possible, as there is that prices should
be as low as possible. Currently, the only ascertainable federal policy
concerning wages is that wages among employees should be compara-
ble and above a minimum level.
C. Implications: Basis for a Unified Theory of Labor-Antitrust Law
Determining the extent to which the Sherman Act applies to un-
ions and their activities has proved difficult for courts and commenta-
tors for many years, but the answer which seems to be emerging
resembles remarkably what Senator Jones told his colleagues on the
Senate floor in 1914: let the Sherman Act apply to the product mar-
kets, and let the labor laws establish national labor policy. 37 9 Most
courts and commentators have sought to articulate the boundary be-
tween antitrust and labor law by examining the extent to which anti-
trust laws should be applied to labor union activity. We, too, seek to
explain the boundary between antitrust and labor law principles, but
our inquiry begins from a completely different vantage point, suggested
by this question: to what extent do the antitrust laws apply to employer
restraints in labor markets?
Having proposed a framework for analysis of employer restraints
in labor markets that devolves ultimately from the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Apex Hosiery, we note with interest two articles examining
the extent to which the antitrust laws apply to labor union activity. In a
1976 article, Professor St. Antoine made the following observation:
"Further refinement of the Apex Hosiery doctrine might have been the
soundest course for the Court to follow in dealing with labor and the
antitrust laws. But that was not to be."' 38 ° Similarly, Professor Leslie's
1980 article on the subject argued that Apex Hosiery "accommodates
labor and antitrust policies in a way consistent with the framework of
378. See supra text accompanying notes 116-29.
379. See upra note 84 and accompanying text.
380. See St. Antoine, supra note 149, at 607.
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the federal statutes. ' 38
1
Upon our examination of a different but related problem, we have
reached the same conclusion. We doubt this is a coincidence. It ap-
pears that Apex Hosiery does indeed provide the basis for a modem,
more cogent theory of labor-antitrust.
381. See Leslie, supra note 1, at 1233.
